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Mexico and El Salvador have been fighting organized crime for decades. While Mexico 
has fought drug cartels with the support of the U.S. government, El Salvador has 
struggled to lower high crime rates mostly with its own resources. Mexico, which has a 
different government structure from El Salvador’s, has not been able to control drug 
trafficking despite the use of armed forces.     
Although Mexico’s approach to fighting drug cartels differs from El Salvador’s 
approach, neither country has been able to control organized crime in its own territory. 
While both countries have used armed forces, the outcomes vary. Mexico achieved 
partial success by incarcerating drug cartel leaders and seizing drugs; however, drug 
trafficking continued. El Salvador’s use of armed forces has been limited, and the 
strategy did not lower high crime rates. Human rights issues have aroused negative 
attention to both countries. The magnitude of the criminal activity in both countries 
requires a more comprehensive approach, rather than the use of armed forces to counter 
criminal organized crime. 
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Mexico and Central American countries have attempted to counteract narcotraffic 
activities in their region. As organized crime has overcome the capacity of public security 
institutions (mainly the police), politicians have put into practice new strategies. Some of 
these strategies, including the use of armed forces in support of security institutions, have 
aroused critical debate. 
This thesis examines how Mexico’s approach to counter organized crime differs 
from El Salvador’s approach. Taking into account El Salvador’s significantly smaller size 
and its different political and administrative structure, a survey of Mexico’s approaches 
to counter narcotics can help us determine which political decisions might work in the 
case of El Salvador. One of the assumptions for this comparative case is that narcotraffic 
activities are harder to control in a larger territory such as Mexico. Second, armed forces 
in Mexico have been given more autonomy to act like a public security body, which has 
brought concerns about human rights abuses and civilian control of the military. Still, 
Salvadoran and Mexican armed forces are institutions with high levels of credibility. 
According to a Pew Research Center report, the population in Mexico and El Salvador 
have a positive opinion of the military, which reached 75% and 77%, respectively.1 
These are relatively high levels of credibility if compared to other institutions such as 
media, civil, and judiciary institutions. 
A. THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The security situation in Mexico differs from that of Central American countries. 
El Salvador went through a civil war in the 1980s. After the peace accords of 1992, 
public security responsibility was transferred to civil authorities. During the civil war, the 
military management of public security institutions and the deployment of battalions all 
over the country allowed the government to control criminal activity in El Salvador. 
However, when the armed forces transferred the responsibility of public safety to the new 
1 Pew Research Center, “Crime and Corruption Top Problems in Emerging and Developing 
Countries,” November 7, 2014, https://www.travel-impact-newswire.com/2014/11/pew-research-crime-
corruption-top-problems-in-emerging-and-developing-countries/. 
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civilian police, the demobilization process created a vacuum that allowed criminal groups 
to diversify and grow stronger. During the early 1990s, gang activity was limited to petty 
crimes, soliciting money from pedestrians, small fights, and the use of drugs.2 However, 
after the peace accords of 1992, gang members coming back from the United States 
joined the local gangs. The new leadership reorganized and strengthened gangs; these 
organizations began to participate in more complex activities such as robbery, murder-
for-hire, extortion, and drug trafficking. 
The sudden reduction of Salvadoran armed forces in 1992 undermined state 
control over criminal activity; public security, which was under the responsibility of the 
armed forces, was transferred to the National Civilian Police as part of the peace accords. 
The new civilian police lacked trained personnel and the experience to take control over 
public security. El Salvador’s 12-year civil war, the serious economic situation, the lack 
of education, and the lack of job opportunities set the stage for gangs to evolve and 
become a major threat to public and national security. This was due to the gangs’ 
territorial control, their ability to penetrate the police and judiciary system, and their 
increased capacity to get involved in transnational criminal activities. As Aguilar stated, 
“In the last years, the transformation of the phenomenon and the transnational links that 
governmental authorities attribute to gangs, is increasingly being associated with 
organized crime and narcotraffic.”3 The gangs’ capacity to challenge government 
authority and alter the normal life of society was evident when in September 2010, gangs 
called for a public transportation strike, aimed to prevent the government from passing a 
law against gangs. 
Despite the fact that the Salvadoran government has authorized the use of armed 
forces since 2005, the success of this strategy is debatable. Homicide rates have been 
high, even with the joint operations developed by the national police and the armed 
2 Jeanette Aguilar, “Las Maras o Pandillas Juveniles en el Triángulo Norte de Centro America [The 




3 Aguilar, “Las Maras o Pandillas,” 25.  
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forces. The only period during which crime rates were lowered was between May 2012 
and February 2013 when a “truce” between the two main gangs promoted by the Ministry 
of Security reduced the daily homicides (from 13–15 a day to 6–8 a day). This reduction 
of nearly 50% is questionable. According to the police, the number of disappeared 
individuals increased during the same period. Oscar Torres, the chief of the Anti-Gang 
Unit of the National Civilian Police, stated that between January 1 and December 1, 
2014, 1,070 persons were reported as disappeared, 525 more than the 545 that were 
reported during the same period in 2013.4 
Mexico’s political experience is very different. The one-party system lasted from 
the 1920s until 2000, and provided great political stability. Even so, weak political 
institutions including the judiciary and the legislative branches have not been able to 
appropriately address the crime problem; for example, an expert, Cecilia Martínez 
Gallardo, affirms that lack of consensus in approving important reforms to the police 
prevents the state from reforming a corrupted police.5  
Some scholars argue that the use of armed forces undermines civilian control, and 
that the use of the military apparatus has not improved control over organized crime. As 
Arturo Sotomayor states, “The side effects of these processes have been devastating. 
Security institutions have been undermined and weakened and civilian oversight eroded, 
while crime rates increase or, when they appear to decrease, they cannot remove the 
generalized sense of insecurity.”6 Sotomayor further argues that despite the population’s 
approval of using armed forces in Mexico (as in the case of El Salvador), unintended 
consequences such as an increase in human rights abuses, weak civilian oversight, and 
spread of “iron fist” policies towards Central American countries are the result of the 
militarization of public security.7 
4 La Opinion (Blog), December 16, 2014, http://www.laopinion.com/noticiaslatinoamerica/article/
20131216/Desaparecidos-crean-duda-en-El-Salvador.  
5 Cecilia Martínez Gallardo, “Mexico,” in Case Studies in Comparative Politics, ed. David J. Samuels, 
(Boston: Pearson, 2013), 273.  
6 Arturo Sotomayor, “Militarization in Mexico and Its Implications,” in The State and Security in 
Mexico, Transformation and Crisis in Regional Perspective, eds. Brian Bow and Arturo Santa-Cruz (New 
York: Routledge, 2013), 55, 56. 
7 Sotomayor, “Militarization,” 48, 49.  
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Even so, the argument here is that Mexico’s approach of interdiction, radication, 
enforcement, and the use of armed forces has had relative success. In some cases, well-
trained units such as the Special Operations Airborne Group (GAFES) carried out 
successful operations during President Fox’s administration (2000–2006). The capture of 
important narcotraffickers such as Alcides Ramón Magaña, Benjamín Arellano Félix, and 
Miguel Angel Caro Quintero are examples of the effectiveness of the GAFES’s 
operations.8 However, El Salvador faces a different threat: gangs. El Salvador’s approach 
has also relied on armed forces in counteracting gang activity, but in this case armed 
forces autonomy has been limited. 
Despite the geographical, territorial, and political differences between Mexico and 
El Salvador, understanding the different approaches of the Salvadoran and Mexican 
armed forces towards fighting narcotraffic activities can be useful in finding new 
strategies to counteract criminal organizations in El Salvador. Additionally, it can be 
determined whether the use of armed forces has had a positive impact in the efforts to 
counter organized crime in El Salvador. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN 
MEXICO AND EL SALVADOR 
In the last decade, Central American countries experienced a significant increase 
in crime rates. In El Salvador, homicide rates of approximately 69 per 100,000 
inhabitants in 20129 have encouraged politicians to use armed forces in support of public 
security institutions. Since Central America is geographically located between drug 
producing and consuming countries, the violence and narcotraffic activities generated by 
Mexican cartels have promoted the expansion of gangs in El Salvador. As Sonja Wolf 
stated, “The gangs are heavily armed and have developed a sophisticated structure. … 
More controversially, they have been linked to Colombian Rebels and Mexican cartels, 
8 Luis Astorga, Security, Traffickers and the Military (Mexico: Tusque Editors 2007), 89. 
9 El Salvador 2013 Crime and Safety Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of 
Diplomatic Security), accessed March 1, 2014, https://www.osac.gov/pages/
ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=13875. 
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and they have been accused of participation in extortion, sicariato, contract killing, and 
the trafficking of drugs, weapons, and humans.”10 
The two main gangs, Mara Salvatrucha and Calle 18, control many communities 
within the Salvadoran territory. Their activities include, but are not limited to, extortion, 
murder, kidnapping, rape, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and smuggling. Criminal 
activity in El Salvador has undermined economic growth, impaired external investment, 
and created fear within society. According to a Pew Research Center report, people 
consider crime “a very big problem” in Mexico and El Salvador. The report concluded 
that 90% of people in El Salvador and 79% in Mexico think that criminality stands over 
other problems such as health, corruption, poor schooling, water and air pollution, food 
safety, and electrical shortages.11 
While there is no certainty about the number of gang members in El Salvador, 
according to the National Civilian Police, the number of gang members is nearly 
28,000.12 There is a well-organized social network that is composed of the gang 
members’ families who support their activities; these family members are assigned 
different tasks like being forward observers, transporting arms and ammunition, cashing 
the money from extortions, and taking supplies to the prison where gang members are 
jailed.  
Although some scholars argue that many governments overestimate the power of 
criminal organizations, the United States has regarded transnational organized crime as a 
security challenge in the western hemisphere.13 Most Latin American countries have also 
regarded transnational crime organizations as a real threat to national security. In a 
conference held in Mexico in October 2003, the American States Organization (OAS) 
10 Sonja Wolf, “Street Gangs of El Salvador,” in Maras,Gangs Violence and Security In Central 
America., eds. Thomas Bruneau, Lucia Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner (University of Texas Press,2011), 
43. 
11 Pew Research Center, “Crime and Corruption.” 
12 La Prensa Grafica de El Salvador, May 25, 2013, http://www.laprensagrafica.com/470-264-
personas-afines-a-pandillas.  
13 Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 
2013), 6.  
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declared organized crime to be an emerging threat to the regional security.14 In Mexico, 
the National Defense Secretary (SEDENA) sent a report to the Defense Committee 
declaring narcotraffic as the highest threat to security.15 Considering this phenomenon as 
a national security threat allows Latin American politicians to legally use armed forces in 
support of public security institutions. While the degree of autonomy given to armed 
forces in Latin America varies, in El Salvador, violence and high crime rates have 
encouraged presidents to use armed forces in a limited way.   
El Salvador’s constitution, in article 168, number 12, states that the president can 
use armed forces to maintain the sovereignty, order, security, and tranquility of the 
republic. That is how, since 2006, armed forces have been ordered to support public 
security institutions. Three executive decrees (60, 70, and 371) submitted in September 
2009, October 2009, and May 2010 created three new commands: “Zeus Command,” 
where soldiers work with police officers in the most violent communities; “San Carlos 
Command,” which took control of prisons; and “Zumpul Command,” which deals with 
the borders.16 The success of armed forces in this new mission was temporary. Crime 
organizations began to evolve and adapt to the new circumstances. Criminals also began 
to accuse the armed forces of violating human rights. Armed forces were put on the 
defensive.  
In contrast to the phenomena of gang activity in El Salvador, Mexican criminal 
organizations have penetrated public security institutions and municipal, state, and 
federal offices. These criminal organizations have taken advantage of political instability, 
have adapted well to the new political environment since 2000, and have taken control of 
cities and territory within Mexico. The new role given to armed forces has provoked drug 
cartels to react more violently. Mexican institutions still suffer from inadequate policies, 
and worse, lack the power to reinforce them. This shows us that even though Mexico has 
14 American States Organization (OAS), “Declaration about Security in the Americas” (Organization 
of American States, Mexico, October 2003), https://www.oas.org/es/ssm/CE00339S03.pdf  
15 “Narcotraffic, The Highest Threat to Security,” La Jornada, 2008, http://www.jornada.unam.mx/
2008/09/30/index.php?section=politica&article=007n1pol. 
16 Junta Interamericana de Defensa, “The Involvement of Armed Forces from the American Continent 
in Public Security Activities” (Washington, DC, June 2012), http://www.oas.org/dsp/documents/
Informe_FA_Emp_Seg_Publica_JID_6-29-12.pdf. 
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addressed the problem from different perspectives, the “balloon effect,” an analogy that 
scholars use to describe efforts to eradicate a problem while creating another, brings new 
forms of operating for criminal organizations, requiring a more comprehensive approach. 
Financial constraints are a constant problem in Mexico and El Salvador. Through 
the Mérida and Colombia plans, the United States has committed billions of dollars to 
counteract the problem in Latin America. The Mérida plan, which was signed in June 
2008, was envisioned to provide three years of funding for Mexico, Central America, 
Haiti, and Dominican Republic. The four pillars are the following: (a) disrupt capacity of 
organized crime to operate, (b) institutionalize capacity to sustain rule of law, (c) create a 
21st century border structure, and (d) build strong and resilient communities. The  
$1.6 billion initiative included security and non-security assistance. Some security 
assistance included port activities for law, enforcement, border security, firearms 
interdiction assistance, prosecutor capacity building, vetted police units, and information 
exchange programs17 (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1.   Mérida Funding for Mexico18  
In El Salvador, through Central Americas Regional Security initiative (CARSI) 
and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) funds, the United States has provided resources to the 
17 “U.S. Embassy in Mexico, Mérida Initiative” (Web page), accessed November 2014, 
http://mexico.usembassy.gov/eng/ataglance/merida-initiative.html.  
18 Congressional Research Service. U.S.–Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and 
Beyond, https://www.google.com/#q=merida+funding+for+mexico+fy2008-fy2015 . 
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Salvadoran armed forces, but these funds seem to be insufficient due to the complexity of 
the problem (see Table 2). 
 
Data from Congressional Research Service 
Table 2.   U.S. Assistance to El Salvador 
Understanding how the approaches of the Salvadoran and Mexican armed forces 
towards fighting narcotraffic activities differ can help us to find, and consider, new 
strategies and operational activities aimed at reducing the high crime rates. The balloon 
effect of Mexico’s strategy shows us that a more comprehensive strategy might be 
necessary to achieve goals effectively. By impairing the activities of drug cartels and 
gangs in El Salvador, lower crime rates can be expected. Furthermore, the comparison of 
Mexican and Salvadoran approaches to fighting criminal organizations might help us find 
new forms of financial and intelligence cooperation among countries in Central America. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a considerable amount of literature about the background, strategies, and 
operations of Mexico’s war on drugs. A wide range of these materials focuses on the 
relationship of Mexico and the United States at different levels (strategic and operative).  
Phil Williams and Dimitri Vlassis provide information, concepts, definitions, 
networks, markets of transnational crime, the activities these organizations perform, and 
 8 
the markets available.19 Their work also includes information about responses and/or 
different approaches to counteract transnational crime. These writings will be helpful 
when recommending new approaches for the case of El Salvador. 
Maria Celia Toro, in Mexico’s “War” on Drugs: Causes and Consequences, 
explains that Mexico’s antidrug policy of prohibition, eradication, and even the use of 
armed forces through the early 1900s until the 1980s, has brought limited results, as drug 
cartels have been able to adapt to the new enforcement environment,20 Mexico’s drug 
market, and the socioeconomic consequences. Toro also claims that a U.S. campaign in 
the 1980s that took place in Florida rerouted the Colombian cocaine to Mexico.21  
Luis Astorga provides a good background of Mexican and U.S. relations in the 
fight against narcotraffic activities along the Mexican border. He also criticizes the lack 
of coordination among the federal, state, and municipal systems of Mexico, and how 
different institutions coordinate efforts and carry out the strategies imposed by the 
government. This analysis helps us to assess which strategies have been more successful 
in the fight against criminal organizations. 
George W. Grayson argues that the weakness of Mexican institutions has brought 
the opportunity for drug leaders to trade drugs with impunity.22 Grayson also criticizes 
President Calderon’s 2006 strategies; new narcotic groups such as the Zetas have 
emerged despite the Mexican government’s effort to apply new approaches.23 Calderon’s 
strategy has also caused the expansion and territorial control within Mexico and 
Guatemala. Grayson also addresses the militarization of Calderon’s war on drugs from 
2006. His writings provide a scope on armed force’s contribution in dealing with drug 
cartels. Although a good degree of success is attributed to the empowering of the armed 
19 Phil Williams and Dimitri Vlasiss, Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts, Activities and 
Responses (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 14, 15. 
20 Maria Celia Toro, Mexico’s War on Drugs: Causes and Consequences (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1995), 27. 
21 Ibid., 31. 
22 George W. Grayson, Mexico, Narco-Violence and a Failed State? (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 2011), 3. 
23 Ibid.  
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forces, it is also argued that the more power is given to the military, and the more time it 
performs as a public security institution, the higher the chances are that it will be 
corrupted. As Jesus Alberto Lopez Gonzalez stated, “Molina (a PAN senator in 1997) 
argued that there were no evidence to assure that the military had been more effective or 
less corrupt than the civilian police in such tasks … more than 150 officers had been 
found to be linked to criminal organizations.”24 
A Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) thesis, “State Capacity and Effectiveness in 
Combating Crime: A comparative Study of El Salvador and Guatemala” by Berthea G. 
Hampton, surveys the capacities and effectiveness of institutions in responding to 
organized crime, government policy, and its influence on the effectiveness of institutions. 
This thesis examines the opportunities available as well as the challenges that Central 
American countries face in their efforts to counteract criminal organizations. Hampton 
exposes the weakness of political institutions, which prevents policies from being 
effective.25 Hampton also emphasizes that corruption is one of the factors that impairs 
success in the fight against criminal activity; furthermore, she evaluates the capacity of El 
Salvador and Guatemala in fighting criminal activity, as well as the impact of weak 
institutions on public security. 
Max G. Manwaring, in his monograph, “Gangs and Other Illicit Transnational 
Criminal Organizations (TCOs) in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica and 
Brazil,” describes criminal organizations as a threat to national, international, and global 
security and addresses the political effects of crime and the challenge to state sovereignty 
and stability. Because of the complexity and coercive force of TCOs, states are prone to 
fail.26 Understanding how criminal organizations evolve and the threat they represent 
will help in determining the cost and benefits of empowering armed forces to counter this 
phenomenon. 
24 Jose Alberto Lopez Gonzalez, The Politics of Civil-Military Relations in Mexico: A Historical and 
Institutional Approach (Saarbrücken, Germany: VDM Verlag, 2009), 224. 
25 Berthea G. Hampton, “State Capacity in Combating Crime: A Comparative Study of El Salvador 
and Guatemala” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012). 
26 Max G. Manwaring, “A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and Other Illicit 
Transnational Criminal Organizations in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil” 
(monograph, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, December 2007). 
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Thomas Bruneau, in “Pandillas in Central America,” assesses the impact of 
criminality in the region. He affirms that the common problems of Latin American 
countries, such as demography and judiciary, social, and economic vulnerability play a 
key role in the security situation in Central America. He further evaluates the impact of 
failed policies against gangs in the area.27 The writings differentiate organized crime 
from gangs, and how they interconnect internally and externally. This provides 
knowledge on the political culture of Central American countries, which can be valuable 
when assessing the Salvadoran strategy in dealing with gangs. 
The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars provides a wide range of 
strategies on security cooperation among countries. Eric E. Olson outlines new strategies 
to confront organized crime in Mexico. He also provides statistics of the increase in 
criminal activity during the last decade. Olson proposes a new approach to security and 
cooperation, based on what he calls the four pillars, which include disrupting and 
dismantling criminal organizations, institutionalizing the rule of law, building the 21st 
century border, and building strong and resilient communities.28 Peter Router provides 
lesson learned from other countries that can be applied to Latin American countries. The 
case of Italy and the United States provides information on government actions that have 
helped in weakening criminal organizations. Some of these actions include increased 
power of federal government, the growth of federal law enforcement, and new legal 
powers.29  
Philip Williams and Knut Walter’s writings on militarization and demilitarization 
in El Salvador explain how Central American countries that have had a long history of 
military rulers have evolved into a new democracy. The transferring of public security 
forces to civilian control in El Salvador came as a result of the 1992 peace accords. 
Armed forces were reduced, and privileges were cut down to a minimum. Williams 
27 Thomas C. Bruneau, “Pandillas in Central America,” Latin America Research Review 49, no. 2. 
(2014). 
28 Eric Olson and Christopher Wilson, “Beyond Mérida,” in The Evolving Approach to U.S.–Mexico 
Security Cooperation (University of San Diego: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, May 
2010), 4. 
29 Peter Reuter, “What Can Mexico Learn from Other Countries’ Successes in Limiting Organized 
Crime?” (Woodrow Wilson Center, December 12, 2011). 
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explains that even though new institutions were created and others were transformed, 
there was still a lot to do to consolidate democratization in El Salvador. The dissolution 
of former public security institutions created a vacuum during the transition to 
democracy, and criminal organizations took advantage of this opportunity to evolve into 
new, efficient, and violent organizations.  
Miguel Salazar and Eric Olson write on Mexico’s major organized crime groups, 
analyzing the advances in counteracting crime organizations in 2010. As they state, 
“2010 was also characterized by a number of significant government inflicted blows 
against major cartel leadership.”30 They also address organized criminal groups in 
Mexico, which provides an insight into how the groups evolve, find new alliances, and 
fight their enemies. Olson also addresses the effectiveness of employing the military to 
fight organized crime. As he states, “Military deployments have been the backbone of the 
Calderon Administration’s battle against organized crime … the logic is that the military 
is less corrupt and more disciplined than the police, and thus benefits from greater 
legitimacy and acceptance from public.”31  
The use of Mexican armed forces has also been a topic for debate within the 
country. Non-governmental institutions have complained about the use of armed forces. 
As Grayson states, “The National Front against Repression, demanded the removal of 
armed forces from the streets because of their harsh treatment of citizens.”32 Eric Olson 
believes that the use of the military in Mexico has been beneficial in some cases. He 
maintains that the military is less corrupt than other security institutions, and also more 
disciplined.33 This should bring more legitimacy to the participation of armed forces in 
counteracting organized crime. Furthermore, he argues that the use of military has led to 
more effective coordination with police forces, such as in Tijuana.34 
30 Miguel Salazar and Eric Olson, A Profile of Mexico’s Major Organized Crime Groups (University 
of San Diego: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011), 2, 3. 
31 Eric L. Olson, Shattered Dreams and Restoring Hope: Organized Crime on the US-Mexico Border 
(Mexico Institute: Woodrow Wilson Institute, February 2010), 5. 
32 Grayson, Mexico, Narco-Violence, 155. 
33 Olson, Shattered Dreams.  
34 Ibid. 
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A critic is Arturo Sotomayor. In his writings about Militarization in Mexico and 
Its Implications, he provides an insight on the disadvantages of using armed forces in 
missions regarding public security. Sotomayor claims that the increasing preference for 
the use of armed forces is based on politics rather than the perception of a threat to 
security.35 Political choices then are the result of external and internal pressure that have 
been put onto the Mexican government.36 Additionally, Sotomayor brings to attention the 
human rights issues, which are the result of eroding civilian supervision and the lack of 
coordination among public security institutions.37 He challenges the effectiveness and 
convenience of the enrollment of the military in fighting organized crime. 
Steven David Brown in his book Combating International Crime, The Longer 
Arm of the Law, provides recommendations on judicial cooperation, tools and techniques, 
information exchange, and the role of national institutions in fighting transnational crime. 
This is useful for drawing conclusions and making recommendations at the end of the 
thesis. 
The literature listed in this section allows the researcher to survey Mexico’s 
approach to countering drug trafficking. The literature provides tools for the analysis of 
Mexico’s success or failure in using armed forces to counteract organized crime in its 
territory. The interaction among political institutions, police forces, and armed forces 
helps us determine lessons learned from Mexico’s experience. The research approach is 
focused on finding the best practices and lessons derived from Mexico’s strategy in 
fighting narcotics, analyzing the institutions and the role of the armed forces and their 
effectiveness. A survey of El Salvador’s fight against organized crime also helps to 
determine an applicable strategy to deal with criminality in the country.   
        35 Sotomayor, Militarization, 42. 
 36 Ibid., 42, 43. 
37 Ibid., 43. 
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II. BACKGROUND ON CRIME ACTIVITY IN MEXICO AND EL 
SALVADOR 
This chapter surveys the background of crime activity in Mexico and El Salvador. 
While there is a common agreement on what constitutes criminal activity and how it 
undermines the security of societies, the phenomena affects countries differently. Crime 
activity in Mexico differs from the crime activity El Salvador has experienced. To better 
understand the security situation of both countries, it is necessary to start with some basic 
definitions. Scholars provide different definitions of organized crime, transnational 
organized crime, and gangs. While some experts believe that gangs are not part of 
organized crime, others closely associate both terms.  
By analyzing the definitions, one can affirm that the concepts of organized crime, 
transnational organized crime, and gangs are interconnected. Salvadoran gangs are 
engaged in criminal activities that have traditionally been carried out by organized crime; 
these activities include extortion, murders, drug trafficking, kidnapping, smuggling, 
robbery, and more. The highly organized feature attributed to organized criminal 
organizations can also be found in the structure of gangs in El Salvador. These structures 
are clearly defined, and responsibilities are specifically assigned for each gang member. 
A. DEFINITIONS 
While there is common consent on what organized crime and transnational crime 
represents to public security, few agreements have been reached when defining gangs. 
The evolution of gangs and their activities have evolved and become so complex that the 
line between organized crime, gangs, and their transnational character is often blurred. 
According to the Black Law’s Dictionary, a gang is “a company of persons who 
go about together or act in concert, especially for antisocial or criminal purposes.38 
Stephen L. Mallory cites other definitions:”Gangs are organized entrepreneurs who 
reinvest profits into the gang. They are structured organizations that market their illicit 
38 Black Law’s Dictionary, ed. Bryan Garner (St. Paul, MN: West Group, 2004), s.v. “gang,” 700. 
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goods and services to make huge profits.”39 Other authors view gangs as “disorganized 
individuals who form alliances to make money for each member.”40 
Stephen L. Mallory affirms that organized crime has a wide range of definitions 
which depend upon the organization, or the perspective of the writer.41 He refers to The 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 1968, which states that “Organized crime 
means the unlawful activities of the member of a highly organized, disciplined 
association engaged in supplying illegal goods and services including, but not limited to, 
gambling, prostitution, loan sharking, narcotics, labor racketeering and other activities of 
members of organizations.”42 
The definition of transnational organized crime is also necessary to analyze if 
gangs in El Salvador can also be considered part of transnational criminal organizations. 
“Transnational organized crime refers to those self-perpetuating associations of 
individuals who operate transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, 
monetary and/or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting 
their activities through a pattern of corruption and/ or violence, or while protecting their 
illegal activities through a transnational organizational structure and the exploitation of 
transnational commerce or communication mechanisms.”43 
The transnational characteristic of gangs is demonstrated by the international 
linkage of the Salvatrucha gang (MS) in Central America and the United States. One of 
the main criminal activities, extortion, is in many cases coordinated between gangs in the 
United States and El Salvador. There are cases in which Salvadoran residents in the 
United States have been threatened that a family member will be assassinated if money is 
not given to the gang in the United States, or money was not sent to the gang in El 
39 Stephen L. Mallory, Understanding Organized Crime (Boston, MA: Jones and Barlett Publishers, 
207), 4. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Mallory, Understanding Organized Crime, 5. 
42 The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Public Law 90-351, 82 STAT. 197, June 19, 
1968. 
43 The White House, National Security Council, Transnational Organized Crime: A Growing Threat 
to National and International Security, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-
crime/threat. 
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Salvador. Additionally, gang members who defect from the gang are given a “green 
light” nationally and overseas, which means that wherever the deserter is found, he will 
be killed. The national and international connections allow gangs to impose these 
punishments to deserters. 
El Salvador’s history of gangs is not new. According to Sonja Wolf, gangs might 
have emerged by 1963. She affirms that a gang study conducted in 1991 by a group of 
students from the Central America University (UCA) included interviews with 116 
members from 25 gangs.44 The gangs belonged to marginal communities of the capital 
San Salvador. The members, who came from lower classes and lacked education, were 
between 7 and 31 years old, but the majority ranged from 15 to 22 years old. The gangs’ 
activities included some remunerated work, training members in the use of weapons, and 
theft.45Their entertainment options included hanging out, consuming drugs and alcohol, 
and fighting other gangs’ members.46 
Wolf also explains that by 1991, the Mara Salvatrucha and the 18th street gangs 
were already established in El Salvador; however, these gangs had improved the 
organization structure, established identification codes and new norms, and gotten better 
weapons.47 
B. MEXICO 
Mexico has a long history of drug trafficking activities. While contraband is an 
older issue, drug trafficking began to take place along the U.S.–Mexican border in the 
1900s. According to Maria Celia Toro, the 1909 Opium Exclusion Act changed the 
normal activities along the U.S.–Mexican border.48 She further implies that the 
44 Sonja Wolf, “Street Gangs of El Salvador,” in Maras, Gang Violence and Security in Central 
America, eds. Thomas Bruneau, Lucia Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner (Austin, TX: University of Texas 
Press, 2011), 44. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Wolf, “Street Gangs,” 44, 45. 
47 Ibid., 45. 
48 Toro, Mexico’s War on Drugs, 7. 
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prohibition strategy implemented in the United States created incentives for drug dealers 
to enter the new market.49 
Mexico’s fight on drugs has been marked by its relationship with the United 
States and the nexus between drug dealers and the Mexican state itself. According to 
Stanley A. Pimentel, Mexico’s official party, Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), 
developed a patron–client relationship in which the state provided patronage to criminal 
organizations while obtaining revenues from criminal activity.50 This relationship 
provides a basic understanding of drug trafficking in Mexico. Furthermore, it explains the 
failure of different approaches in countering the phenomenon. 
1. The Period from 1916 to 1970 
The origins of organized crime and narcotraffic in Mexico can be traced to the 
early years of the 20th century. In the early 1900s, the U.S.–Mexican border had little or 
no attention from both governments. People and merchandise were able to move freely 
along the border, and security forces in Mexico focused on controlling Chinese 
immigration into the United States.51 At that time, opium, marijuana, and heroin were 
legal drugs in the United States and Mexico, and Chinese immigrants were the ones 
supplying drugs to the United States.52 As drug prohibition laws such as the Harrison 
Narcotic Act in 1914 were passed in the United States, the Mexican government began to 
coordinate with its American partners and create strategies and operations to control drug 
trafficking along the U.S.–Mexico border. From the beginning of Mexico’s fight to 
counter narcotraffic, Mexican officials were involved in this activity. 
In 1916, the governor of Baja California, Coronel Esteban Cantú, was selling 
leases to smuggle opium into the United States for a $45,000 down payment and monthly 
49 Ibid. 
50 Stanley A. Pimentel, “The Nexus of Organized Crime and Politics in Mexico,” in Organized Crime 
and Democratic Governability, Mexico and the  US–Mexico Borderlands, eds. John Bailey and Roy 
Godson (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 33, 34. 
51 Joe C. Shipley, “What Have We Learned from the War on Drugs? An Assessment of Mexico’s 
Counternarcotics Strategy” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2011), 11. 
52 Paul Kenney and Mónica Serrano with Arturo Sotomayor, Mexico’s Security Failure. Collapse into 
Criminal Violence (New York: Routledge, 2012), 30. 
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payments of $10,000.53 After Cantú left office, the governors who followed him 
continued their involvement with drugs, even after the federal government of Mexico 
banned marijuana in 1920 and opium in 1926. According to Luis Astorga, the problem 
with drug trafficking, dating back to the beginning in the early 1900s, was that politicians 
at different levels have been involved in this phenomena. As Astorga stated, “There is 
evidence that a pattern of control by politicians over criminals is more accurate than the 
contrary thesis that posits the traffickers’ penetration of the clean, transparent, and 
virginal field of politics.”54 
In 1944, U.S. and Mexican authorities began to have closer coordination to 
control drug trafficking. During this year, the Commander of the Second Military Zone 
General Juan Felipe Rico, who was the Governor of Baja California, met with Rae V. 
Vader, a U.S. agent of the U.S. Treasury Department, who proposed Rico to select 
Mexican agents that he could trust. The new agents would be the chiefs of police of 
Tijuana, Ensenada, and Tecate. U.S. Council Moers denied the proposal to avoid 
comments that the U.S. government was intervening in Mexico’s internal affairs.55  
Cooperation between the United States and Mexican authorities brought good 
results between 1945 and 1946. The chief of police, Colonel Escudero, announced that 
106 had been arrested, including the American drug dealer Max Coss. However, other 
high ranking officers were accused of being involved in narcotraffic activities. Harry 
Aslinger, who was the head of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Narcotics, affirmed in 1947 
that high level Mexican state authorities were involved in the drug business. This was 
confirmed when journalists from the newspapers Excelsior, El Universal, and Ultimas 
Noticias accused the Secretary of War and the Navy, later governor of Sinaloa, General 
Pablo Macías Valenzuela of controlling and protecting the traffic of opium while in 
53 Luis Astorga, Drugs without Frontiers (Mexico: Grijalbo, 2013), 17. 
54 Luis Astorga, “Organized Crime and the Organization of Crime,” in Organized Crime and 
Democratic Governability, Mexico and the US-Mexican Borderlands, eds. John Bailey and Roy Godson 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2000), 69. 
55 Astorga, Organized Crime, 42. 
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office.56 The weaknesses of the Mexican security institutions were evident when Max 
Coss escaped in 1950 and was recaptured in 1951. 
U.S.–Mexican cooperation continued through the 1960s and 1970s. In 1969, the 
head of the U.S. Treasury Department, David M. Kennedy, sent a report to Mexico, 
stating that nearly 80% of heroin coming into the United States was produced in France 
with Turkish opium, and that most of that drug was seized at the Mexican border.57 The 
drug was sent to the United States by minor smugglers who illegally crossed the border. 
The Mexican states that were mentioned in the report included Sinaloa, Sonora, Jalisco, 
Morelos, Durango, and Nuevo León. On the other side, Mexican authorities affirmed that 
between 1965 and 1969, 94k of Adormidera (a plant used to produce opium), 328k of 
opium, and 189 tons of marijuana had been burned.58  
A change in Mexico strategy came along with a change in U.S. policy towards 
narcotrafficking activities. In September 1969, President Nixon began to put more 
pressure on Mexican authorities. The United States initiated Operation Intercept, which 
was aimed to stop the flow of marijuana by eliminating drug plantations. The success of 
this operation has been debatable. According to Astorga, the operation was later 
considered as a major political failure. Operation Intercept was then replaced by 
Operation Cooperation, which included the use of technology and the use of herbicides to 
prevent the traffic of cocaine and heroin, to enhance security along the border, and to 
revise extradition accords.59 The strategy reflected the same policies that had been used 
for decades with some modifications, but drug traffic became a major concern for both 
countries. This elevated concern would be the grounds for a higher commitment from the 
United States to counteract drug trafficking in the next decades.  
56 Astorga, Organized Crime, 70. 
57 Astorga, Drugs Without Frontiers, 346. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Astorga, Drugs without Frontiers, 350. 
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2. The Period from 1970 to 2013 
With the signing of the U.S. Controlled Substances Act of 1970, President Nixon 
laid the foundation for the new “War on Drugs.”60 This law created the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 1973. Since authorities in the United States had 
thwarted the transit of morphine into the U.S., cultivation and traffic of opium poppy in 
Mexico expanded (see Figure 1).  
 
        
Figure 1.  Cartel’s Territories and Routes61 
In 1976, the Mexican government carried out Operation Condor, aimed to 
eradicate plantations in the Sinaloa-Durango-Chihuahua triangle. This operation involved 
10,000 soldiers commanded by General Jose Hernandez Toledo, defoliating drug 
plantations. This is one of the first times that the military was formally accused of human 
rights abuses. As Grayson stated, “At the same time, reports of abuses proliferated as 
human rights attorneys denounced the Mexican military’s shocking people with electric 
pods, gouging their eyes, shoving their heads into excrement toilets, and forcing soft 
drinks and gasoline up prisoner’s noses.”62 
60 Grayson, Mexico, Narco-Violence, 28. 
61 Map Copyright 2008 Strategic Forecasting Inc., STRATFOR www.stratfor.com .  
62 Ibid., 31. 
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The dynamics of drug trafficking in Mexico changed in the 1980s. Crude oil 
prices fell. This weakened Mexico’s economy, and the peso was devalued up to 60%; the 
struggling economy, together with the beginning of Colombian drug cartels smuggling 
drugs through Mexico’s border, increased drug trafficking in the area.63 Drug cartels 
began to consolidate (see the appendix). According to Maria Celia Toro, the United 
States increased expenditures between 1981 and 1989. The South Florida Task Force was 
able to reroute the flow of drugs in Florida that came from Colombia through the 
Caribbean.64 
Mexico’s war on drugs was marked during this period by the assassination in 
1985 of the U.S. agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena and his pilot; he was investigating 
marijuana plantations owned by Rafael Caro Quintero. The killings of the two U.S. 
citizens encouraged the U.S. government to name drug trafficking as a threat to national 
security. As Joe C. Shipley stated, “Reacting to the murder, U.S. President Ronald 
Reagan (1981–1989) took a momentous step in 1986, declaring drug trafficking a threat 
to national security. The fairly innocuous-sounding step created an opening in the United 
States for involvement of the U.S. military.”65  
As a result of these killings, the U.S. government initiated a drug certification 
process in 1986, which evaluated the efforts on drug-producing countries.66 The 
certification process brought changes to both U.S. and Mexican institutions in order to be 
more effective in controlling organized crime activity. The U.S. reaction increased the 
historical distrust between the two countries. As Freeman and Sierra stated, “Twice, in 
1969 and 1985, the U.S. government essentially shut down the U.S.–Mexico Border in 
counter drug-related actions. … Mexico refused to receive U.S. drug assistance for 
several years during the 1990s.”67 This was due to the lack of trust between the countries 
63 John Bailey and Roy Godson, Organized Crime and Democratic Governability, Mexico and the 
U.S. Mexican Border (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000). 
64 Toro, Mexico’s War on Drugs, 31. 
65 Shipley, “What Have We Learned,” 34. 
66 Kenney and Serrano, “Mexico’s Security Failure,” 37. 
67 Laurie Freeman and Jorge Luis Sierra, “Mexico, the Militarization Trap,” in Drugs and Democracy 
in Latin America, eds. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 265. 
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and the frustration derived from Mexico’s inability to control the flow of drugs into the 
United States. 
As the drug marketing changed, new cartels arose during the 1990s. In 1996, 
Mexico’s General Attorney Office (PGR) identified a new group composed of ex-
military members known as the Zetas. The group consisted of 40 ex-military, among 
them second lieutenants, lieutenants, and former members of the Special Operations 
Airborne Group (GAFES). The Zetas sought to confront the highest levels of law 
authorities.68 This new group began to operate in Jalisco, Tamaulipas, and along the 
border with Guatemala. 
President Vicente Fox, who took the presidency in 2000, improved U.S.–Mexico 
relationships regarding the war on drugs. This brought considerably good results; 
according to Laurie Freeman and Jorge Luis Sierra, during the first three years of Fox’s 
presidency, nearly 22,000 people were arrested and among them, the Tijuana cartel leader 
Benjamin Arellano Felix, who had been arrested in 2002 by special forces.69 
Additionally, the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil on September 11, 2001, encouraged the 
U.S. government to review its security agenda. 
The DEA took advantage of the terrorist attack to associate terrorism with drug 
trafficking.70 The reinforcement of security along the U.S.–Mexico border presupposed 
that narcotraffickers would have more difficulties smuggling drugs into the United States. 
This proved to be false. As Astorga stated, “According to the official statistics (Mexican) 
that measure the fight on drugs, there have been advances, but in reality, the situation has 
worsened because there have been more drug seizures and captures simply because 
production has increased, and there are more people on the business.”71  
Since Felipe Calderon won the Presidency in 2006, his policy against narcotraffic 
mostly consisted of making the armed forces the tip of the spear to counteract the 
68 Astorga, Security, Drugs, Traffickers, 164. 
69 Freeman and Sierra, “Mexico, the Militarization Trap,” 265. 
70 Astorga, Security, Drugs, Traffickers, 23. 
71 Ibid., 25. 
 23 
                                                 
phenomenon of narcotraffic. Armed forces were by then considered the most reliable 
force for the job. Additionally, according to Sylvia Longmire, the Mexican military had 
more manpower and firepower than police forces. Furthermore, they had been more 
successful in capturing major drugs kingpins in the last years.72 President Calderon 
employed nearly 45,000 troops, which temporarily brought good results but also 
increased violence (see Table 3). 
 










2013 6,150 (Through October 4) 
TOTAL 47,268 
Table 3.   Drug-Related Deaths in Mexico73 
President Calderon claimed that as long as there was no reduction in demand from 
the United States, the supply from Mexico would be difficult to stop, posing shared 
responsibility for the flow of drug into the United States. The Mérida initiative signed in 
December 2008, covered Mexico, Central America, Dominican Republic, and Haiti.74 
The initial aid consisted of $1.4 billion for the training, equipment, and intelligence from 
72 Sylvia Longmire, Cartel, The Coming Invasion of Mexico’s Drug Wars (Palgrave Macmillan, New 
York, 2011), 113. 
73 George W. Grayson, The Cartels. The Story of Mexico’s Most Dangerous Criminal Organizations 
and Their Impact on U.S. Security, 2014. (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2014), 90. 
74 Ibid., 93. 
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which the armed forces benefited. The Mérida initiative consisted of four main lines: (1) 
disrupting the capacity of organized crime to operate, (2) developing the capacity of 
judicial and security institutions to sustain the rule of law, (3) building a 21st-century 
border that facilitates legitimate trade and flow of people, while thwarting the flow of 
drugs, arms, and cash, and (4) building strong an resilient communities.75 
In December 2009, Arturo Beltran Leyva, who was allied with el Chapo Guzman 
from the Sinaloa Cartel, died after marines surrounded his place in Cuernavaca; Ignacio 
“Nacho” Coronel, the second of the Sinaloa cartel, was shot while trying to escape.76 The 
army also killed or arrested other cartel members and seized tons of drugs.  
In 2010, new, bizarre alliances and conflicts took place among the drug cartels. 
The Gulf cartel and the Zetas began an open war which led to alliances with old enemies; 
the Gulf cartel allied with La Familia, while the Sinaloa cartel allied with the Zetas. 
Significant captures during 2010 were made, as Miguel Salazar and Eric. L. Olson 
explained: 
2010 was also characterized by a number of significant government-
inflicted blows again major cartel leadership. The Beltrán Leyva 
Organization suffered the most series setbacks with the death of its 
principle leader, Arturo Beltrán Leyva, in December 2009 and the 
subsequent arrest of two others leaders including Carlos Beltrán Leyva in 
January and U.S.-born Edgar “La Barbie” Valdez Villarreal in August. 
Government operations variously led by the Mexican Marines, Army, and 
Federal Police resulted in the deaths of organized crime leaders from the 
Gulf—Antonio Ezequiel Cárdenas Guillén AKA Tony Tormenta; 
Sinaloa—Igancio “Nacho” Colonel; La Familia Michoacana—Nazario 
Moreno; and the arrest of Eduardo Teodoro “El Teo” Garcia Simental 
amongst others.77 
Despite the relative success of 2010, murder rates increased by 60% compared to 
2009. Efforts to counteract drug trafficking in Mexico continued through 2012 and 2013. 
In 2012, the Navy and Federal Police Support forces captured Jose Ines Medina 
Rodriguez, leader of the Gulf cartel, in Cadereyta, Nuevo León; then in early 2013, U.S. 
75 Grayson, The Cartels, 94. 
76 Ibid., 114. 
77 Salazar and Olson, A Profile of Mexico’s. 
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authorities captured another Gulf cartel leader, Jose Luis Zuñiga Hernandez “El Wicho,” 
which weakened the organization. 
President Enrique Peña Nieto, elected in December 2012, has shown the 
willingness to continue to rely on armed forces to fight organized crime. He announced 
the creation of a Gendarmería Nacional (GN), a similar model to Spain’s Guardia Civil.78 
As he stated, “This corps would form part of a territorial control body that allows the 
exercise of the sovereignty of the Mexican State.”79 The military police was the unit in 
charge of training the Gendarmerie; however, the government would not allow law 
enforcement officers in order to avoid the new unit to be corrupted. The Gendarmerie 
was to be assigned five zones to quickly respond and prevent crime such as robbery, 
murder, extortion, rape, and kidnapping.80 The project did not succeed. According to 
Grayson, the Gendarmerie was seen as campaign rather than a serious project, and the 
GN initiative was taken from the National Development Plan (PND) which was supposed 
to be implemented between 2013 and 2018.81 
With the capture of Gordillo (a corrupted union leader), President Peña Nieto 
gained political support to pass a constitutional amendment to reform the national 
communications law. This would give power to a regulatory agency to break up phone 
and TV networks, which was supposed to strengthen the central government.82 In 
February 2014, Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman was captured in Sinaloa; he had been 
captured in June 1993 and had escaped in January 2001. 
In conclusion, Mexico has continued to rely on armed forces to counter drug 
trafficking during the last two presidential periods (Fox, 2000–2006, and Calderon, 
(2006–2012). Despite the efforts in changing laws, coordinating operations with the U.S. 
agencies, and using armed forces, narcotraffic activity continues. While the use of armed 
78 Grayson, The Cartels, 172. 
79 Alejandro Hope, “Is It Worth Creating a Gendarmerie in Mexico?” InSight Crime, December 10, 
2012. 
80 Grayson, The Cartels, 173. 
81 Ibid., 174. 
82 Ibid., 164. 
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forces has had good results, cartels continue to operate within the Mexican territory. 
Furthermore, weak political institutions and weak public security institutions have 
prevented Mexico from reducing drug trafficking in the country. 
C. EL SALVADOR 
El Salvador’s history of violence differs from Mexico. From the early 1900s, El 
Salvador has had two sources of violence: (1) the violence usually originated in the poor 
sectors of society such as robberies, street fights, homicides, and bodily injures; and (2) 
the violence originating with social inequality and authoritarianism. While El Salvador  
has had high crime rates, most of the violence experienced by Salvadoran society from 
1900 to 1980 comes from political and social unrest. El Salvador has had a long history 
of military rule. From 1932 to 1979, the country was ruled by presidents with military 
backgrounds. An “under the table” alliance with the oligarchy allowed them to stay in 
power for such a long time. The land and wealth in the hands of few provoked the 
emergence of unions and the communist party in the 1900s.  
The exclusion and repression towards social organizations brought violence and 
instability to the country. Despite the long period in which the military was in power, 
governments were able to develop the infrastructure of the country through the revenues 
coming from the growth of cotton and coffee. Social instability continued throughout the 
1970s; this instability, coupled with the influence of the Cold War, erupted in the 12-year 
insurgency that ended with a United Nations–supported peace accord in 1992. Increased 
criminal activity that developed after the peace accords, mostly originated by gangs, has 
challenged Salvadoran public security institutions that have not been able to control the 
phenomena. A survey of El Salvador’s history of violence provides an understanding of 
the ongoing security situation in the country. 
1. The Period from the 1900s to 1940s 
During this period, Salvadoran society began to experience the effects of 
criminality. Since the early 1900s, the media has published articles which described the 
day-to-day felonies and crimes that individuals committed in El Salvador. The felonies 
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included street fights, robberies, murders, prostitution, and alcohol abusers.83 The media 
that played a key role in society argued that criminality was the result of alcohol 
consumption. According to Carlos Moreno Martinez, by 1929, most of the 2,171 crimes 
committed against individuals were caused by people who had consumed alcohol.84 
In 1932, Vicente Navarrete, a Congress member, proposed a law to regulate the 
use of weapons and machetes.85 The law, approved in 1939, affected peasants who used 
machetes for their daily work. Congress drew another law against vagabonds and 
malefactors in 1940.86 The object of this law was to bring vagabonds to justice because 
the government perceived that this class of people was prone to commit crimes. This 
shows that the state segregated and repressed poor people, instead of seeing them as 
subjects who needed support and attention.87   
El Salvador also used the death penalty to try to repress criminal offenders. 
Between 1913 and 1949, 14 people were executed.88 Those sentenced to death were 
executed publicly as warning to future law breakers. It is important to note that in 1939, 
article 36 of the Salvadoran Constitution modified the death penalty. The death penalty 
would be applied for crimes committed by military members such as espionage, sabotage, 
sedition, or conspiracy to commit them. Additionally, the death penalty would be applied 
to whoever committed homicides against parents, and robbery followed by murder.89 
Nonetheless, homicide rates kept constant from the 1920s through the 1940s (see Table 
4). 
83 Carlos Moreno Martinez, “Criminality and Death Penalty in El Salvador from the XX Century 
(1900–1983)” (bachelor’s thesis, University of El Salvador, 2011), 71. 
84 Ibid., 73. 
85 Ibid., 78. 
86 Martinez, “Criminality and Death Penalty,” 9. 
87 Ibid., 80, 81. 
88 Ibid.,102, 103. 
89 Ibid., 94. 
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Table 4.   Homicides per Year in El Salvador 1928–198090 
On the other hand, El Salvador’s heritage of colonial rule shaped the relationships 
within society. Over time, class struggle has marked the relationships within the 
Salvadoran society. As Thomas Skidmore and Peter Smith stated, “Three centuries of 
imperial rule inflicted deep and painful wounds on cultures of the region, imposing 
hierarchical relationships of subordination and dependency.”91 This hierarchical 
relationship has been a constant feature in the political, social, and economic life of El 
Salvador.   
The unequal distribution of land to grow indigo and coffee brought economic 
inequalities and ethnic/class antagonism. The wealth in the hands of few people 
encouraged society to organize and establish labor organizations. In 1904, the Union of 
Workers Society was founded; the Union and another worker organization, “La 
Concordia,” had well organized structures. In 1911, in San Salvador, communist 
organizations celebrated the first Central American Workers Congress, and by 1912, 
90 Martinez, “Criminality and Death Penalty,”117. 
91 Thomas E. Skidmore, Peter H. Smith, and James N. Green, Modern Latin America (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 14. 
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there were nearly 40 union organizations. With the Soviet revolution of 1917, union 
organizations became stronger and communist ideas were propagated in Latin America. 
Marxist literature came to El Salvador from New York, Mexico, Panama, and 
Argentina.92 
By 1930, while the Communist Party arranged meetings throughout El Salvador, 
the government pursued and incarcerated people who were sympathetic to Marxist ideas. 
The government repression continued and protests became common as communists asked 
for the liberation of those that had been captured. Communists constantly protested 
against exploitation of peasants who worked the land. An insurrection in January 1932, 
led by the secretary of the Communist Party, Farabundo Martí, protested against the 
government on the west side of the country. The government sent the National Guard (a 
public security unit from the armed forces) to contain the insurrection. The revolt resulted 
in approximately 30,000 people dead, and Farabundo Martí received the death penalty.  
In addition to social and economic inequality, a political alliance between the 
oligarchy and the military allowed the latter to stay in power from 1932–1980 (see Table 
5).  
92 “History of the Communist Party,” Social Communist Party of El Salvador (blog), 
http://partidocomunistadeelsalvador.blogspot.com/2010/11/historia-pcs_7326.html. 
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General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez 1932-1934 
General Andrés Ignacio Menéndez 1934-1935 
General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez 1935-1944 
Coronel Osmin Aguirre y Salinas 1945-1945 
General Salvador Castaneda Castro 1945-1948 
Revolutionary Council 1948-1950 
Lieutenant Colonel Oscar Osorio 1950-1956 
Lieutenant Colonel José María Lemus. 1956-1960 
Lieutenant Colonel Julio Adalberto Rivera 1962-1967 
General Fidel Sánchez Hernández 1967-1972 
Colonel Arturo Armando Molina 1972-1977 
General Carlos Humberto Romero 1977-1979 
First Revolutionary Board 1979-1980 
Second Revolutionary Board 1980 
Third Revolutionary Board 1980-1982 
Table 5.   Authoritarian Presidents of El Salvador93 
The authoritarian regimes that protected elites’ interests were subject to coups 
d’état. The first took place in 1931, when President Arturo Araujo (a wealthy land owner) 
was replaced by Vice President General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez. 
2. The Period from the 1940s to 1979 
The rule of military regimes continued through the 1940s up to 1979. General 
Martinez continued his presidency, but in April 1944, a coup d’état took place. Finally, 
resigning in May 1944, Martinez was replaced through elections by Colonel Osmin 
Aguirre in October 1944. Colonel Aguirre was then quickly replaced in March 1945 by 
General Salvador Castañeda Castro. During Osorio’s presidency (1950–56), he aimed to 
implement new reforms. Enrique Baloyra stated that “Osorio’s reform concerned some 
aspects of the social situation, primarily the problem of agriculture and the creation of a 
Social Security Institute (ISSS), the Urban House Institute (IVU), and the Rural 
Settlement Institute (ICR).”94 The Oligarchy approved the intentions of developing the 
93 “Presidentes de El Salvador”, monografías.com, accessed September 18, 2014, 
http://www.monografias.com/trabajos34/presidentes-el-salvador/presidentes-el-salvador.shtml.  
94 Enrique Baloyra, El Salvador in Transition (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 
1982), 37. 
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infrastructure of the country. President Jose Maria Lemus (1956–60) resorted again to 
repression to deal with the unrest cause by the deterioration of the economy due to the 
fall of coffee prices in 1958.95 
A coup d’état on March 1972, originated by young military officers, instigated 
military units in San Salvador to revolt. “Led by Colonel Benjamin Mejía, the rebels 
quickly gained control of San Salvador and captured President General Sánchez 
Hernández and his daughter … although he had the solid support of the army, the air 
force and all security forces remained loyal to the government.”96 The government 
settled the dispute and punished the instigators.  
3. The Period from 1979 to 1992 
A coup d’état took place in 1979; the Young military, led by Col. Gutierrez, 
managed to get control of the country and President Romero was sent to Guatemala. The 
purpose of this coup d’état was to settle population unrest and prevent the war; a “Junta” 
(a revolutionary board) was set up but was not able to stop the revolutionary insurrection. 
“More people died in the first three weeks after the coup than had died in any equivalent 
period during the Romero Regime.”97 The social unrest, poverty, inequality, and wealth 
in the hands of privileged classes caused demonstrations which gave birth to the civil war 
in 1980. It is fair to say that in addition to the internal conditions of El Salvador, external 
conditions also contributed to the war that lasted twelve years.  
El Salvador was caught in the middle of the Cold War. Communist ideas were 
spreading to Central American countries. They found in the poor countries of the region 
the perfect ground to call for civil unrest. By 1979, Communist ideas had already change 
the regime in Nicaragua, and Marxists needed El Salvador to continue the spread of their 
ideology to Central America. New countries that turned to communism provided perfect 
sanctuaries for the USSR in its fight with the United States. The civil war started in 1980, 
95 Ibid., 38. 
96 Tommie Sue Montgomery, Revolution in el Salvador: From Civil Strife to Civil Peace (West View 
Press, San Francisco,1992), 64. 
97 Montgomery, Revolution, 64,65. 
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and the USSR began to send weapons to El Salvador via Cuba, then Nicaragua to support 
the guerrillas; additionally, the USSR trained guerillas to efficiently fight Salvadoran 
armed forces efficiently. Salvadoran armed forces, who were not trained to fight an 
irregular war, were supported by the United States. The United States provided aircraft, 
equipment, weapons, and training so that the government could be prepared to fight the 
insurgency. 
The long period of military rule in El Salvador ended with the presidential 
elections in 1984. The new rightist party Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) 
competed in the elections with the Christian Democratic Party. After Napoleón Duarte 
won the presidency, he initiated talks and meetings with the guerillas in order to negotiate 
a peace agreement between the government and the FMLN (Farabundo Martí National 
Liberation Front). The first meeting aimed to draw a peace accord took place on October 
25, 1984, in La Palma, Chalatenango, a small town located north of the capital, but the 
parties could not come up with any agreement. 
As the war came to a stalemate in 1989, none of the parties involved in the conflict 
foresaw the chances for a military victory. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the USSR 
reduced the support to the FMLN, and the guerillas leaders were forced to negotiate. 
Alfredo Cristiani from the right hand party won the presidential elections in 1989; under 
U.S. pressure, he looked for UN and international support to find a peaceful agreement to 
end the 12-year insurgency war.  
The peace agreement signed in Chapultepec, Mexico, in January 1992 included 
the creation of a truth commission to determine who was responsible for violating human 
rights during the war period. While both sides had committed human rights abuses, left 
hand politicians blamed armed forces. As Montgomery stated, “The commission found 
that 95 percent of human right violations were attributable to the Armed Forces of El 
Salvador or paramilitary death squads; the FMLN was responsible for the remainder.”98 
Military members and right hand political parties challenged the numbers of human rights 
98 Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador, 242. 
 33 
                                                 
abuses perpetrated by armed forces, as they stated that there were not sufficient evidence 
of those abuses. 
The bloody civil war in El Salvador encouraged thousands of people to look for 
better opportunities and security outside the country. As Sara Gammage stated, “It is 
estimated that more than 25 percent of its population migrated or fled during the 
country’s civil war, which began in 1979 and ended in 1992. Approximately 1.5 million 
Salvadorans now live and work in the United States; 39,000 are in Canada according to 
Statistics Canada, with about 20,000 in Australia and another 12,000 in Italy according to 
the Salvadoran Ministry of Foreign Relations.”99 
ICE, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) are the agencies responsible for enforcing the U.S. civil 
immigration laws. In executing its enforcement duties, ICE focuses on two core missions: 
(1) identifying and apprehending public safety threats—including criminal aliens and 
national security targets—and other removable individuals within the United States; and 
(2) detaining and removing individuals apprehended by ICE and CBP officers and agents 
patrolling our Nation’s borders.100  
Some of the people who migrated to the United States became gang members. 
These members went back to El Salvador after the civil war ended in 1992. According to 
Sonja Wolf, the end of insurgency and anti-immigrant feeling in the United States 
spurred American agencies to be more determined to repatriate illegal immigrants.101 
“The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, which 
expanded the definition of deportable aggravated felonies to include a range of lesser 
offenders, further facilitated the process.”102 The new gang leaders redefined the gang’s 
99 Sara Gammage, “El Salvador: Despite End to Civil War, Emigration Continues,” Migration 
Information Source, July 26, 2007, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/el-salvador-despite-end-civil-
war-emigration-continues. 
100 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “FY 2014 ICE Immigration Removals,” accessed 
January 18, 2015, http://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics.  
101 Wolf, “Street Gangs,” 48. 
102 James Diego Vigil, A Rainbow of Gangs: Street Culture in the Mega-City (Austin, TX: University 
of Texas Press, 2002), 144–145. 
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organization and modus operandi, and changed their objectives and strategies. Before 
1992, gangs were limited to petty crimes, soliciting money, and committing small 
robberies. 
During the war period, Salvadoran armed forces managed public security 
institutions, and the security situation seemed to be controlled. The spread of the armed 
forces all over the territory of El Salvador allowed them to have presence everywhere, 
which provided some deterrence of criminality. The transfer of public security 
responsibilities from armed forces to the new National Civilian Police (PNC) created a 
vacuum that allowed gangs to reorganize, spread, and control some territory. Lack of 
resources for the new police prevented them from controlling the territory left by the 
armed forces. As Montgomery stated, “The most serious problems for the PNC in the 
field were threefold: A lack of resources, poor working conditions, and politicization … 
complaints about insufficient vehicles, radios, arms, and uniforms were heard in every 
police post.”103  
The perception of the new National Civilian Police is well stated by an officer 
deployed in San Vicente: “When we arrived there was great publicity and the gangs 
disappeared. But when they discovered there were no vehicles or arms, they 
reappeared.”104 The transfer of responsibility from armed forces to the new National 
Civilian Police was carried out without the required resources which resulted in the 
emergence and consolidation of gangs all over the country.   
4. The Period from 1992 to 2014 
After the peace accords that ended a 12-year insurgency in El Salvador, the 
population had a genuine desire to end violence A successful UN mission helped to 
terminate the bloody war by which Salvadorans had killed themselves for years, but 
history would dictate otherwise. El Salvador’s destroyed infrastructure and economy 
undermined the possibility of bringing economic and social progress for the society. 
103 Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador, 240. 
104 Ibid.  
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An inadequate demobilization progress did not allow revolutionaries and 
demobilized troops to integrate into society. This left a vacuum which criminal 
organizations took advantage of. El Salvador is currently one of the most violent 
countries in the world, with a rate of approximately 69 murders per 100,000 inhabitants. 
The problem has encouraged the government to regard gangs as a threat to public 
security. Their activities include extortion, murder-for-hire, sexual violence, assault, 
carjacking, drug trafficking, and human trafficking.105 
The high crime rate has forced the Salvadoran government to use armed forces in 
support of public security institutions. This policy, enforced by the Mano Dura (Hard 
hand policy) under the presidency of Francisco Flores in 2003, brought unintended 
results. Prisons were overpopulated, and only a small percentage of prisoners were 
sentenced. Furthermore, the incarceration of gang members strengthened the criminal 
organization. Massive incarcerating of gang members under the Mano Dura policy 
allowed the gangs to establish better coordination and control of criminal activities 
outside prisons. As Thomas Bruneau stated, “Analysts demonstrate that the Mano Dura 
policies actually facilitated gang organization and recruitment, due to the simultaneous 
incarceration of thousands of youth gang members and ‘wannabes.’”106 From 2006, 
under the “Zeus Command,” armed forces were deployed to accompany the National 
Civilian Police in patrolling the most dangerous communities in El Salvador. The support 
included security for prisons and security for the border. 
In May 2012, the government attempted a new approach to deal with the high 
crime rates. Although at the beginning, the government denied any involvement, the 
“truce” supported by public security authorities brought the two main gangs, Mara 
Salvatrucha and Calle 18, to a negotiating table. Fabio Colindres, the armed forces 
archbishop and Raul Mijango (an FMLN member) mediated between the two gangs. The 
government conceded some prerogatives to the heads of the two gangs. These 
105 El Salvador 2013 Crime and Safety Report.  
106 Thomas Bruneau, “Pandillas and Security in Central America,” Latin America Research Review 
(June 2014), 163. 
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prerogatives included the transfer of gang members from maximum to minimum security 
prisons, the use of cell phones and televisions; and the change of visiting rules. 
The truce had good results temporarily; murders diminished from 13–15 per day 
to 7–8 in 2012, but increased again in 2014. Most of the population disapproved of the 
government’s concessions to gangs. The elected Salvadoran President Salvador Sanchez 
Ceren created in 2014 a National Council for Citizen Security (CNSCC) which is 
composed of political, civil, and societal forces as well as international organizations. 
The members of this Council have denied further negotiations with gangs. According to 
Insight Crime, “With Attorney General Luis Martinez—a fierce critic of the truce—
sitting on the council, the rejection of the proposal to open dialogues was less surprising 
than the proposal itself, and another sign that not only is the gang truce dead, but so are 
any short-term prospects of renewed negotiations.”107 
In summary, a long history of violence in El Salvador has set the ground for 
today’s violence and high crime rates. Other factors such as inequality, poverty, lack of 
job opportunities, an insurgency war, and economic stagnation have also contributed to 
the phenomenon. The migration caused by the factors above mentioned not only ended in 
the disruption of families, but it exposed young migrants to gangs in the United States. 
The return of young gang members to El Salvador allowed gangs to evolve, reorganize, 
and challenge the authority of the government. Weak political and public security 
institutions have not been able to control the situation. While the limited use of armed 
forces has been debated, high crime rate remains one of the main problems for society 
and government.  
107 David Gagne, “Organized Crime in the Americas” (Web), Insight Crime, November 6, 2014, 
accessed January 18, 2014, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/el-salvador-squashes-talk-of-dialogue-
with-gangs. 
 37 
                                                 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 38 
III. PUBLIC SECURITY CAPACITY AND STRATEGY TO 
RESPOND TO CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
Institutions within a state are created to reach national objectives, maintain 
internal security, defend the state from external aggression, and provide for the well-
being of its population. Scholars agree that building strong political institutions should 
lead to development, stability, and social order. This chapter analyses Mexico’s and El 
Salvador’s institutional capacities. As public security institutions are the organizations in 
charge of preventing crime and enforcing law, a survey of institutions in both countries 
will help in assessing to what degree these institutions have the capacity to counter 
organized crime. 
Mexico and El Salvador differ in government structure and capacity but both 
countries have engaged in strategies which have brought different outcomes. Armed 
forces in Mexico and El Salvador also differ in capacity, manpower, fire power, and 
equipment, but both have been used to support public security institutions. While a 
different degree of autonomy has been given to both armed forces, the evidence suggests 
that none of them have reached the desired result for which they were intended. 
A. MEXICO 
Throughout the 20th century, Mexico’s political system was dominated by the 
Partido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI). The president was given absolute power; he 
controlled all governmental agencies, the legislative branch, and the judiciary. According 
to Stanley Pimentel, other societal actors such as the church and the media were 
manipulated and eventually became part of the political system.108 
Pimentel explains that because the Mexican political system gave absolute power 
to the president, institutions could not act professionally and that the lack of a check and 
balance system allowed corruption to penetrate the system without any accountability of 
any governmental organization.109 
108 Pimentel, “The Nexus,” 37. 
109 Ibid., 38. 
 39 
                                                 
The Mexican political system changed in 2000 with the defeat of the PRI for 
presidential elections, but this did not translate into effective governance. Broader 
political participation provoked deadlock in the legislative system, and the government 
has been slow to advance on economic and social reforms. 
1. Political Institutions and Public Security 
Political institutions in Mexico are similar to those in the United States. The 
president is elected by a direct vote, it has a bicameral legislature, an independent 
judiciary, and a federal system.110 The country is divided into 31 states and one federal 
district where the Executive (Governor) is elected by popular vote. At the local level, the 
states are divided in municipalities; each of the 2,430 municipalities has a municipal 
president and a municipal council. 
Mexico’s security cabinet consists of an Attorney General, a Deputy Attorney 
General for Judicial and International affairs, a Deputy General for Specialized 
Investigation of Organized Crime (SIEDO), the Secretary of Public Security (SSP) and 
his Sub secretary for Police Intelligence and Strategy, a Coordinator for Regional 
Security (PFP), a Coordinator of the Federal Support Forces, the secretary of national 
defense (SEDENA), Secretary of the Navy (SEMAR), the Secretary of Interior 
(SEGOB), the director of Center for Research on National Security (CISEN), the 
Executive Secretary of Mexico’s National Public Security (SNSP), and the Technical 
Secretary of National Public Security (CNSP). 
Mexico has been regarded as a country with a political system that has had close 
connections with organized crime. According to Peter A. Lupsha, there are two basic 
patterns of criminal-political relationship; the “stage-evolutionary model” and the “elite-
exploitation model.” The first one describes the relationship between organized crime and 
political systems based on three stages: a predatory, a parasitical, and a symbiotic stage. 
The second one, the “elite-exploitation model,” refers to the pressure exerted on criminal 
organizations by social control agents.111 
110 David Samuels, Case Studies in Comparative Politics (Boston: Pearson, 2013), 250. 
111 Pimentel, “The Nexus,” 39, 40. 
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According to Pimentel, the “elite-exploitation model is the one that represents the 
case of Mexico.” As he states, “Political authorities used social control agents to organize 
and regulate drug trafficking. Traffickers were manipulated and disposed of to suit the 
need of political officials.”112 This problem, has been endemic in Mexico since the early 
1900s, when governors such as Colonel Esteban Cantú facilitated opium trade in Baja 
California, in exchange for money. Pimentel further claims that family-run businesses 
smuggled into the Unite States the greatest amount of drugs, and that it was these families 
that had raised drug cartel leaders such as Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo, Rafael Caro 
Quintero, Amado Carrillo Fuentes, and the Arellano brothers, among others.113 
Pimentel also explains that the PGR (Federal Prosecutor) was usually the 
intermediary between drug traffickers and the higher level politicians. The arrangement 
was normally coordinated through a lawyer who worked with criminal organizations. 
Suitcases with huge quantities of money were sent to high-level politicians through 
subordinate members of the PGR. 
The relationships between politicians and criminal organizations are well 
explained by Pimentel’s quote from Lupsha:  
The trafficker was expected to assist the police and the political system by 
providing grist for the judicial mill (i.e., pinpoint or inform on rival 
traffickers) as well as public relations materials to give the U.S.: drug 
enforcers. Thus, while the trafficker could gain protection and warning 
information, the police could gain credit, praise, and promotions; the 
political system gained campaign monies and control; and the U.S. 
obtained statistics, to justify a job well done.114 
The involvement of political institutions in drug trafficking activities undermines 
the capacity of political and public security institutions in countering organized crime. 
So, the question remains how could organized crime could be prevented if the political 
institutions themselves are involved in the problem and live off it? 
112 Ibid. 
113 Pimentel, “The Nexus,” 41. 
114 Ibid., 50. 
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2. Police Forces 
The capacity of Mexico’s law enforcement agencies continues to be challenged. 
Eric L. Olson states that questions about the capacity of Mexican institutions in 
countering drug trafficking include corruption, investigation processes of the police 
forces, and a legacy of abusive police practices with the use of torture to get 
confessions.115 According to the Pew Report 2014 on Crime and Corruption, the police is 
one of the least trusted public institutions.116 Additionally, and according to Pimentel, the 
Mexican Ministry of Treasury does not provide sufficient resources to government 
institutions like the Attorney General’s Office (PGR) and the Federal Judicial Police. He 
further explains that government agencies send their officers to perform public security 
activities without resources, encouraging them to earn money by arresting organized 
crime leaders and seizing their goods.117 
Mexico has an estimated 2,600 local police forces, 400,000 of the police officers 
operate at the municipal, state, and federal levels.118 The federal police is responsible for 
counter narcotics efforts, which require a close coordination with state and local police. 
Police forces are divided into two levels: preventive and investigative forces. The 
Mexican government has made efforts to reorganize the police in order to coordinate 
operations, such as the creation of the Federal Preventive Police (PFP) in 1998, under the 
Public Security Ministry. Additionally, in 2001 under the presidency of Vicente Fox, the 
government created the Federal Investigation Agency (AFI) which was put under control 
of the Attorney General Office (PGR).  
The lack of effectiveness on the part of police forces has encouraged the Mexican 
government to increase the use of their armed forces. According to Olson, “the military 
has greater firepower and operational capacity than the police, and is generally perceived 
115 Eric L. Olson, Six Key Issues in U.S.–Mexico Security Cooperation (Mexico Institute, Woodrow 
Wilson Center, 2008), 4. 
116 Pew Research Center, “Crime and Corruption.” 
117 Pimentel, “The Nexus,” 42. 
118 Olson, Six Key Issues, 4. 
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as less corrupt.”119 The Pew Report on Crime and Corruption from 2014 showed that the 
military is the one of the most trusted institutions in Mexico; nonetheless, questions about 
its strategy, vulnerability to corruption, and human rights abuses have been raised. 
The impact of using the military in counter-narcotics efforts is well stated by 
Olson:  
In the immediate term, it would appear that the Mexican Military has 
succeeded in reestablishing order in areas hard-hit by drug related violence 
and intra cartel feuds such in Michoacán, Guerrero, and Nuevo Laredo. 
There is also evidence that the military presence has merely displaced the 
violence, and, in some instances, such as in Nuevo Laredo, has resulted a 
stalemate with the cartels, reducing the levels of horrific violence, but not 
completely rooting out organized crime, which continues to have 
stronghold on the city.120 
The use of military institutions and their involvement in counter narcotraffic 
activities has had mixed results. On one hand, the military has increased public 
acceptance for its capacity to restore order in some areas where the cartels operate; on the 
other, the institution has been exposed to the negative effects of corruption and drug 
money, such as the case of dozen of GAFES who now are part of the Zetas.121 
External cooperation has played a key role in Mexico’s war against drug 
trafficking (see Table 6). 
119 Olson, Six Key Issues, 4. 
120 Olson, Six Key Issues, 8. 
121 Olson, Six Key issues, 7, 8. 
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Total 432,799 582, 658 346,562 329,680  205,490 
Development Assistance 11,200 10,000 26,304 33,350  10,000 
Economic Support Fund 15,000 15,000 10,000 33,260  35,000 
Foreign Military Financing 39,000 262,250 8,000 7,000  7,0000 
Global Health and Child Survival—
USAID 
2,900 3,458 3,458 1,000   
International Military Education and 
Training 
834 1,050 1,100 1,190  1,449 
International Narcotics Control and Law 
Enforcement 
360,000 284,000 292,000 248,500  148,131 
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, 
Demining, and Related Programs 
3,845 3,900 5,700 5,380  3,910 
Table 6.   U.S. Assistance to Mexico122  
3. Armed Forces 
Despite Mexico’s history of military subordination to civilian control, a great 
degree of autonomy has been given to the military. The military decides the size of the 
organization, the purchase of armament, equipment, and contracts, and the Ministry of 
Defense is run by the military.123 According to Laurie Freeman and Jorge Luis Sierra, 
Mexican presidents have officially given the military a role in public security since 1955. 
The institution’s discipline and reputation is supported by polls that show that 53% of 
Mexicans have confidence in the army, in contrast to 32% who have confidence in the 
police.124  
Freeman and Sierra affirm that the militarization of efforts against narcotraffic 
involves two interrelated dimensions: (1) the expanding of the military institution into 
122 Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Annex: Regional 
Perspectives, Fiscal year 2011/2014. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/137937.pdf.  
123 Freeman and Sierra, “Mexico, the Militarization Trap,” 268. 
124 Ibid., 269. 
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internal law enforcement responsibilities, and (2) the appointment of military personnel 
to posts inside civilian law enforcement institutions.125 They further argue that the United 
States encouraged Mexico’s government to use armed forces, due to their manpower and 
equipment to fight powerful drug cartels. Additionally, Mexican law enforcement 
agencies have already been known as corrupted institutions that worked in compliance 
with drug cartels. 
4. Strategy 
Mexico’s strategy in countering narcotraffic has been variable throughout time. 
Most of the time, Mexico’s policy has been influenced by the U.S. policy. Documents 
from the U.S. State and the Treasury Department provide information on drug related 
affairs from 1916 up to 1970.126 For more than 30 years, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics 
(FBN), directed until 1962 by Herry J. Anslinger, constituted the center of the U.S. policy 
towards narcotraffic activity. This organization changed its name in 1973 to the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA). Most of the DEA strategy has been based on 
prohibition, crop eradication, interdiction, and the increased use of armed forces since the 
1980s. 
Instead of controlling drugs and alcohol, Prohibition which initiated in the early 
1900s promoted the smuggling of it. As Maria Celia Toro stated, “In the case of Mexico, 
the prohibition of both alcohol and drugs in the United States became an incentive to 
exporters, who could take advantage of the prices that resulted from newly formed 
clandestine markets.”127 
Eradication campaigns initiated in the 1940s did not bring good results. Despite 
the use of the military in the eradication strategy, Toro affirms that drug growers seemed 
to have more efficient intelligence networks than the military itself. In many cases, 
growers would burn the crops before the military could arrive.128 The capacity of 
125 Freeman and Sierra, “Mexico, the Militarization Trap,” 277. 
126 Astorga, Drugs without Frontiers, 11. 
127 Toro, Mexico’s War on Drugs, 7. 
128 Ibid., 13. 
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growers to adapt to the new situation by moving to other areas shows that this strategy 
did not reduce the spread of drug production; growers looked for other alternatives to 
continue their activities. 
Interdiction, seizures, and eradication efforts have been strengthened with the use 
of armed forces. As the U.S. government increased expenditures in countering drug 
trafficking during the 1980s, Mexican authorities relied more on military forces. Toro 
affirms that based on Mexican statistics, the police and the military reported a significant 
increase in cocaine seizures, from 4,907 kg in 1985 to 33,029 kg in 1991.129 
Mexico has also increased cooperation with the United States to extradite 
criminals. According to Grayson, Mexico extradited 178 criminals to the United States 
during the first years of President Calderon.130 
5. Effectiveness of Policy 
The effectiveness of using armed forces to counter organized crime in Mexico is 
debatable. According to George Grayson, Mexican military forces have focused on 
interdiction, crop eradication, and intelligence gathering; additionally, during Fox’s 
presidency, the number of cartel members that were extradited to the United States rose 
from 17 in 2001 to 63 in 2006.131 
While the Mexican government had indeed achieved some success in using the 
military, such as the capture of cartel leaders and important seizures of drugs, violence 
and drug trafficking continues to the present. Drug-related deaths in Mexico rose from 
1,000 in 2001 to more than 12,000 in 2011.132 The relative effectiveness of the military 
in counteracting drug trafficking is lessened with the increase of human rights complaints 
from the population. 
129 Ibid., 31. 
130 Grayson, Mexico,107. 
131 George W. Grayson, Mexico’s Struggle with ‘Drugs and Thugs,’ Headline Series (Foreign Policy 
Association no. 331, Winter 2009), 47. 
132 Samuels, Case Studies, 253. 
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6. Impact on Civil-Military Relations  
Experts in civil–military relations consider that when armed forces are focused on 
solving internal affairs, civilian control becomes more difficult to attain. As Michael C. 
Desh stated, “a state facing low external and high internal threats should experience the 
weakest civilian control of the military.”133 
President Felipe Calderon’s use of armed forces in countering drug trafficking has 
been criticized. According to George G. Grayson, Calderon’s strategy to fight cartels 
involved the militarization of the nation, at a time when society was not asking for the 
involvement of the armed forces.134 He further affirms that many cities have contracted 
ex-military members to fulfill posts that have traditionally been held by civilians such as 
the Secretaries of Public Security, Municipal, and Preventive Police. This policy has 
provoked clashes between the retired officials and police forces.135  
Grayson also affirms that despite Mexican society’s past support of the use of 
armed forces, that support has slowly reduced. As he states, “Even though the populace 
backs its fight against DTOs, the army suffered a slight decline in support for this role; 
this support fell from 83% in 2009 to 80% in 2010. In early 2012, 70% of respondents to 
a consultant Mitofsky survey favored the military’s continuing to pursue criminal 
organizations.”136  
Human rights issued have also been on the debate. The use of armed forces has 
resulted in thousands of complaints of human rights violations. As Grayson states, 
“National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) claimed to have 5,055 complaints, many 
against the military, during Calderon’s tenure. The same group asserted that 5,300 people 
have disappeared in this period.”137 
133 Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1999), 14. 
134 Grayson, The Cartels, 117. 
135 Ibid., 119, 127. 
136 Grayson, The Cartels, 137. 
137 Ibid., 136, 137. 
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B. EL SALVADOR 
El Salvador’s long history of military rule prevented the government from 
building effective institutions. A centralized government that stayed in power for most of 
the 20th century was able to control legislative and judiciary powers. After the civil war 
ended in 1992, the government built up new institutions and transferred public security 
from the military to the National Civilian Police. 
El Salvador’s political system became more democratic as new political players 
were allowed to participate. The FMLN, once a guerrilla movement, became a political 
party. With the FMLN’s incorporation to the political system, other institutions such as 
the National Civilian Police, human rights, and NGOs became important players in the 
new-born democracy. But democracy did not bring the economic and social progress that 
most had expected. Poverty, social inequality, lack of job opportunities, and wealth in the 
hand of few continue to increase the gap among social classes. 
1. Public Security Institutions 
Weak public security institutions have not been able to control criminal activity in 
El Salvador. Despite the National Civilian Police’s effort in countering gangs, high crime 
rate, extortions, robberies, kidnap, and drug trafficking continue to be normal events in 
the lives of Salvadorans. A weak judiciary, an uncontrolled prison system, and an 
unequipped, undermanned police has encouraged the government to use armed forces; it 
is necessary to survey the role of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security to 
understand why armed forces have been given the role of supporting police forces. Some 
scholars like Juan Carlos Gomez say that the use of armed forces in democratic states is 
viable and necessary, but that it is paramount to know when and how these forces will 
use force. He adds that the limitation should come from the rules established in the 
human rights and international human laws.138 
The Ministry of Justice and Public Security is the entity in charge of public 
security in El Salvador. The main components are divided in directories. The Directory of 
138 Juan Carlos Gomez, “Twenty-First-Century Challenges: The Use of Military Forces to Combat 
Criminal Threats,” International Law Studies 88 (2012). 
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Migration and Foreigners, the Directory of Prisons, the Directory of Prevention of Social 
Violence, and Ant-Drug National Commission, and the National Civilian Police. The 
prison system and the National Civilian Police are two main organizations in charge of 
public security in El Salvador. 
A weak prison system prevents the Ministry of Security from maintaining control 
inside prisons. The director of prisons from 2004 has assigned exclusive jails to the two 
main gangs (Mara Salvatrucha and Calle 18) in order to prevent violence inside the 
prisons. As Roberto Valencia stated, “That Thursday morning, close to 1,100 prisoners—
almost 10% of the entire population were moved between four of the country’s prisons: 
Santa Ana, Sonsonate, Quezaltepeque and Ciudad Barrios.”139 This division of gangs 
inside prison continues up to date. Valencia sustains that this measure has facilitated the 
evolution of gangs. Furthermore, prisons in El Salvador are one of the most overcrowded 
prisons in Latin America. With a 300% of overcrowding, the system is unable to control 
prisoners. (See Figure 2). 




                                                 
 
Figure 2.  Overpopulated Prisons in Latin America140 
According to the U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 2013, “As of September 3, the Prison Directorate reported 26,672 prisoners 
held in 23 correctional facilities and one secure hospital ward that had a combined 
appropriate capacity of 8,328.”141 This explains why prisons are so difficult to control 
and why criminals continue to order criminal activity, even from inside the prison. 
2. Police Forces 
The National Civilian Police (PNC) has a hierarchical structure and organization. 
It is responsible to the President of the Republic through the Minister of Justice and 
Public Security (Bentito Lara), whose department is assigned public security functions; 
under no circumstances will this be the Ministry of National Defense. Ordinary command 
of the PNC is exercised by the Director General, who is the senior administrative 
authority and legal representative.142 
140 PNUD, 2012. 
141 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, El Salvador, 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=220442 
142 National Civilian Police of El Salvador, Organic Law, art. 6. 
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According to the U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 2013, “Inadequate training, lack of enforcement of the administrative police 
career law, arbitrary promotions, insufficient government funding, failure to effectively 
enforce evidentiary rules, and instances of corruption and criminality limited the PNC’s 
effectiveness.”143 Despite the government’s effort in increasing the strength of the 
National Civilian Police, criminal activity in El Salvador has overcome the police 
capacity (see Table 7). 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 




275.5 282.4 287.8 316.7 337.7 340.02 
Table 7.   National Civilian Police’s Strength144 
The National Civilian Police strategy is composed of 5 pillars: (a) control and 
repression of crime, (b) social prevention of violence and crime, (c) execution of 
measures, penalties, rehabilitation and social incorporation, (c) attention to victims, and 
(d) legal and institutional reforms.145 With the execution of hard hand policies, the police 
has mostly focused on repression of crime by incarcerating gang members. This not only 
overcrowded prisons, but also strengthened the organization and operation of gangs. 
Another feature of the National Police is the participation of its members in criminal 
activity. 
Despite the National Civilian Police efforts to prevent the organization from being 
penetrated by organized crime, 1,456 police members were investigated in 2009 by the 
143 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports. 
144 National Civilian Police of El Salvador. 
145 The Situation of Security and Justice 2009–2014 [La Situacion de la Seguridad y La Justicia 2009-
2014], ed. Jeanette Aguilar (San Salvador: Central American University [UCA], University Institute of 
Public Opinion, September 2014), 194 (Appendix), http://www.uca.edu.sv/iudop/wp-content/uploads/
libro_la_situaci%C3%B3n_de_la_seguridad.pdf. 
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General Inspector of the Police (IGP). Of those investigated, 216 were officers and 14 
were high level officers.146 These cases were handed over to the General Attorney Office 
(Fiscalía General de la Republica [FGR]) and the officers were temporarily suspended, 
but the results of that investigation are unknown up to date. High level officer were 
involved in this investigation, such as the case of the ex-Police Director Ricardo 
Meneses, commissioner Pedro Gonzalez, Godofredo Miranda, and Douglas Omar García 
who had been accused of collaborating and favored a group of narcotraffickers who 
operated in the western part of the country known as Los Perrones (The Dogs).147 The 
case brought public attention. A demand against Police General Inspector Navas came as 
result of the investigation and the high level police officers accused her of political 
harassment.  
The University Institute of Public Opinion (IUDOP) believes that some politicians 
made arrangements to protect the accused as one of the Legislative members Colonel 
Antonio Almendariz created a special commission to investigate the case.148 The process 
did not advance; due to the failure of police and the General Attorney authorities to 
investigate, the accused were re-assigned to their posts and the cases were filed. 
3. Armed Forces 
a. Decrees that Allowed the Executive to Use Armed Forces 
High crime rates and insecurity in El Salvador have encouraged the Executive to 
use armed forces in support of public security institutions. According to El Salvador’s 
constitution, in article 168, number 12, the President can use armed forces to maintain the 
sovereignty, the order, the security, and tranquility of the republic. That is how, since 
2006, armed forces have been ordered to support public security institutions. The 
government later made this policy official through three executive decrees (60, 70, and 
371) submitted in September 2009, October 2009, and May 2010. These decrees were 
aimed to organize three new commands: “Zeus Command,” where soldiers work with 
146 Ibid., 82.  
147 The Situation of Security and Justice, 83. 
148 Ibid. 
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police officers in the most violent communities; “San Carlos Command,” which took 
control of prisons; and “Zumpul Command,” which deals with the borders.149 
b. The Role of the Armed Forces, Its Responsibilities, and Its Strategy to 
Use Troops in Counteracting Criminal Activity 
The role of armed forces in support of public institutions has been limited. Zeus 
Command, which was created to provide support in the most dangerous areas of the 
country consists of army units designated to work with the police with joint task forces. 
These joint task forces are usually composed of two policemen and three to four soldiers 
(the size of the task forces varies depending on the task and place) who carry out patrols, 
vehicle searching, pedestrian searching, captures, and drug seizures. During these 
activities, it is the police who do the captures while soldiers provide security so that the 
police can do their work. In some cases, armed forces operate independently and, if they 
arrest someone, the person is handed over to the police with the due paper work. 
The Armed Forces have a presence in the 14 states; six Brigades, one Military 
Police Command, an Engineering Command, and an Artillery Command provide troops 
to support the national police. Troops are replaced every 10 days and rotated every six 
months. Rotating troops every six months requires on-the-job training for the incoming 
troops and for the officers in charge. As there is not a permanent command (officers and 
troops) dedicated to public security activities, situational awareness is lost, and by the 
time officers are acquainted to the situation, they are rotated out.  
The use of the military in support of public security has increased throughout the 
2000s and 2010s (see Table 8). However, this strategy did not translate into a reduction 
of homicides between 2010 and 2011: the crime rate rose from 64.8 to 70.3 per 100,000 
inhabitants, with an average of 13 daily deaths.150 
149 Junta Interamericana de Defensa, “The Involvement of Armed Forces.”  
150 The Situation of Security and Justice, 94. 
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Table 8.   El Salvador’s Military Forces in Support of Public Security.151 
4. Strategy 
Criminal activity in El Salvador has encouraged the government to regard gangs 
as a threat to national security; their activities include extortion, murder-for-hire, sexual 
violence, assault, carjacking, drug trafficking, and human trafficking.152 El Salvador has 
implemented repression policies to counter gangs. This policy, enforced by the plan 
Mano dura (Hard hand policy) under the presidency of Francisco Flores in 2003, brought 
unintended results. Prisons were overpopulated, and only a small percentage were 
sentenced. Furthermore, the incarceration of gangs strengthen them. As Thomas Bruneau 
stated, “Analysts demonstrate that the Mano Dura policies actually facilitated gang 
organization and recruitment, due to the simultaneous incarceration of thousands of youth 
gang members and “wannabes.”153 From 2006, under the Zeus Command, armed forces 
were deployed to accompany the National Civilian Police in patrolling the most 
dangerous communities in El Salvador. The support included security for prisons and 
security for the border. 
151 The Situation of Security and Justice. 
152 El Salvador 2013 Crime and Safety Report.  
153 Bruneau, “Pandillas and Security,” 163. 
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The government attempted in May 2012 a new approach to deal with the high 
crime rates. Although at the beginning, the government denied any involvement, the 
“truce” supported by public security authorities brought the two main gangs Mara 
Salvatrucha and Calle 18 to a negotiating table. The armed forces Archbishop Fabio 
Colindres and ex-FMLN combatant Raul Mijango mediated between the two gangs. The 
heads of the two gangs were conceded some prerogatives such as the transfer of gang 
members from maximum to minimum security prisons. The truce had a temporary result; 
murders diminished nearly 50% in 2012, but it increased again in 2014. Most of the 
population disapproved this strategy. 
El Salvador’s strategies to fight organized crime have failed. Mano dura and 
Super Mano Dura plans did not bring the desired results. Other debatable measures such 
as the so called “Truce” in 2010 lowered the crime rate temporarily; however, this 
decision was mostly disapproved by the Salvadoran society. It seems that while the 
country does not provide solid economic opportunities and overcomes social inequality to 
reduce poverty and class struggle, it will be difficult to achieve success when 
implementing individual policies. The approach has to be a comprehensive one. 
5. Effectiveness of the Use of Armed Forces in Gangs and Criminal 
Activity 
Despite the government policy, new laws and the use of armed forces, high crime 
rates and insecurity remain in El Salvador. Statistics show that the use of armed forces 
has not lowered the historical high crime rates, as can be seen in Figure 5; from 2003, 
there has been a tendency to increase, with the exception of 2012 and 2013 when the 
“truce” was in effect. Although the truce has not officially ended, gangs continue to 
increasingly use murder as a strategy to force the government to continue negotiating 
benefits for jailed gangs members. This shows the inefficacy of using armed forces and 
















2012 2,571 During the “truce” period 
2013 2,492 
2014 3,565 (Dec. 10, 2014) 
Table 9.   Homicides in El Salvador154 
Since 2006, the armed forces have constantly increased the number of officers 
and troops in support of public security institutions. The number of officers and troops 
engaged in public security operations went from 897 in 2006 up to 11,200 in 2014.155 
Once again, neither the use of armed forces nor the increase in the number of troops in 
support of public security institutions has dropped high crime rates. According to the 
Institute of Public Opinion from the Central America University (UCA), “these strategies 
have not dropped homicides, nor has there been a reduction in the feeling of insecurity 
among the population. Between 2010 and 2011, the homicide rate went from 64.8 to 70.3 
per 100,000 in habitants, an average of 13 homicides a day”156 Furthermore, complaints 
about human rights violations have been increasing—57 in 2009, 215 in 2010, 363 in 
2011, and 263 in 2012. 
6. Impact on Civil-Military Relations 
The use of armed forces in countering organized crime in El Salvador has the 
approval of the public. According to the Pew Research Center, 77% of people think that 
154 Ministry of Justice and Public Security, National Civilian Police, PNUD 
155 The Situation of Security and Justice, 90. 
156 Ibid, 94. 
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the military is a good influence in the country.157 While most of the population accepts 
the participation of armed forces in support of public security institutions, debates about 
this strategy have arose among other sectors of societies. When a former military leader, 
General Munguia Payes, was assigned to be the head of the Ministry of Justice and Public 
Security at the end of 2011, agreements on how the problem of criminality should be 
approached were difficult to attain. The new Ministry of Security proposed to give more 
power to armed forces to counter criminality, while the Security Cabinet asked the 
military to handover the garrisons to the police.158 
The tension between the Ministry of Security and civil society reached its peak in 
May 2013, when the Supreme Court determined that the assignment of General Munguia 
Payes as the head of the Ministry of Security was unconstitutional, based on the fact that 
he has not lost his military nature. The complaint had been initiated by 30 citizens who 
demanded the Supreme Court to declare that the assignment was against the constitution. 
The General was then re-assigned to the Ministry of Defense. This case demonstrates that 
institutions worked, and reflects the state of civil–military relations in El Salvador. 
C. COMPARING POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND 
STRATEGY OF MEXICO AND EL SALVADOR 
1. Comparing Institutions’ Capacity 
Mexican and Salvadoran institutions have not been able to provide effective 
governance. In Mexico, the Partido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI) centralized power 
during the 20th century. This allowed Mexico to have political stability but did not 
promote limited government in practice.159 According to Cecilia Martinez, legislative 
elections in 1997 changed the story because the opposition gained the majority of 
seats.160 The new balance of power allowed Mexico to practice a checks and balances 
system and broader political participation. Martinez explains that the change in the 
157 Pew Research Center, “Crime and Corruption.”  
158 The Situation of Security and Justice, 66, 67.  
159 Cecilia Martínez Gallardo, “Mexico,” 250. 
160 Ibid., 251. 
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dynamics of politics has not translated into economic and social reforms due to internal 
divisions in the legislative branch. Furthermore, the judicial system has continued to be 
plagued of corruption, preventing the government from practicing horizontal 
cooperation.161 Corruption, indeed, has undermined the state’s capacity to counter 
criminality. As Martinez stated, “The legal system is marked by impunity for criminals 
… corruption has been an obstacle in the government’s effort to fight drug cartels and to 
control the spread of violence related to organized crime.”162 
In El Salvador, the long term alliance between the military and the oligarchy in El 
Salvador prevented the government from providing the necessary benefits to the 
population. Poverty, lack of job opportunities, a weak education, and health system set 
the ground for violence in the 20th and 21st century. After the signing of the peace 
accords in 1992, El Salvador began to develop democratic institutions. The public 
security institutions which were in the hands of the military were transferred to the new 
National Civilian Police. The new which was undermanned, lacked education, training, 
and experience. Lack of equipment and transportation and a poor logistic system 
prevented the National Police from controlling crime from the very beginning of its 
creation. 
When comparing the weaknesses of politics and institutions of Mexico and El 
Salvador, it is noticeable that the nexus between political institutions and organized crime 
is more evident in the case of Mexico. The long history of corruption and political 
involvement in criminal activity has caused the failure in every attempt to counter 
narcotraffic. This has prevented Mexico from effectively enforce law and reduce drug 
trafficking. The political system in Mexico also prevents the government from 
coordinating policies among public security institution to effectively combat crime. Lack 
of resources of government agencies undermines the authority of Mexican local 
authorities in enforcing law.  
161 Martinez, “Mexico,” 251. 
162 Ibid., 252. 
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In the case of El Salvador, although one cannot find a clear nexus between 
political institutions and organized crime, public security institutions lack the capacity 
and resources to effectively enforce law. A weak judiciary, a poor prison system and an 
under manned police force has prevented the government from providing security to the 
Salvadorean society. In both cases, the use of armed forces are seen as an institution that 
has the capacity, the equipment and training to help in combating organized crime. 
Furthermore, both armed forces have relative high level of acceptance and credibility 
among society. However, experience suggest that the strategy of using armed forces in 
counteracting criminality as an isolated approach brings few or none results when trying 
to reduce criminal activity. 
2. Comparing Mexico’s and El Salvador’s Strategies 
Mexico’s strategy to fight drug trafficking encompasses a wider range than those 
employed by El Salvador authorities. The long term drug trafficking phenomena that 
Mexico has faced obligated the government to use a variety of strategies, ranging from 
prohibition, combined operations with the United States, eradication, seizing, and the use 
of armed forces. Drug traffickers’ capacity to adapt to Mexico’s strategy resembles the 
gangs’ capacity in El Salvador to evolve and also adapt and respond to the governments’ 
effort in countering criminality. When comparing Mexico’s and El Salvador strategies, 
one can note that in the case of Mexico, armed forces have been given more autonomy 
than the one given to El Salvador’s armed forces. This has allowed Mexican armed forces 
to perform independent operations, and has brought some success in the fighting against 
organized crime; nevertheless, the used of armed forces has not stopped drug trafficking.  
In El Salvador, iron fist or hard hand policies aimed to repress criminals. The 
incarceration of thousands of gang members did not lower the high crime rates. As the 
judiciary did not find hard evidence of the crimes committed by gang members detained 
as result of hard hand policies, gangs were strengthened. While El Salvador faces the 
threat of gangs, the limited used of armed forces has not brought the same results as in 
the case of Mexico.  
 59 
In both cases, the prolonged use of armed forces has brought up human rights 
issues, but the problem seems to be more serious in the case of Mexico. The use of armed 
forces without putting proper attention to the human rights issues creates a problem while 
trying to solve another. As Sotomayor states, “From the outset of the Calderon 
administration, it was clear that upholding human rights was not an important concern in 
the design of the security approach.”163  
The effectiveness of using armed forces is closely related to the political will, 
institutional capacity, and human and material resources that are not available in Mexico 
and El Salvador. The strategy of using armed forces in El Salvador to counter criminal 
activity has had no impact on high crime rates and criminality, while Mexican military 
have captured important cartel leaders, intercepted drugs, and eliminated drug crops. 
163 Kenny, Serrano,and Sotomayor, Mexico’s Security Failure, 131. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
1. El Salvador’s approach to counter criminal activity includes the use of 
armed forces in joint task forces with the police, support with the vigilance and security 
of prisons, and joint task forces to patrol the borders. In my opinion, the limited 
participation of armed forces is due to the state of civil–military relations in El Salvador. 
Politicians and the Ministry of Justice and Public Security have limited the role of the 
armed forces because they recognize that giving additional power to armed forces can be 
counterproductive. Society and politicians know the risk of letting armed forces conduct 
public security operations, a lesson learned from the insurgency. 
2. The impact of using armed forces is debatable. High crime rates are still 
an issue in both countries. In the case of El Salvador, while some politicians on the right 
have proposed giving the armed forces increased power to enforce criminal law in order 
to be more effective, the government has authorized only a limited range of operations to 
be performed.  
3. Other approaches, such as the implementation of a “truce” between the 
two main gangs in El Salvador, temporarily lowered high crime rate, but the truce was 
not sustainable. Criminals have neither the intention nor the credibility to be reliable in 
such pacts, which made the truce fail as gangs have no real compromise to integrate into 
society. The truce promoted by the government strengthened gangs in El Salvador. By 
giving criminals power to negotiate, the gangs were able to obtain benefits for jailed 
leaders, including the transfer of leaders from maximum to lower security level prisons, 
permissions to obtain commodities within the prisons, and others.  
4. Concerns about human rights violations are an ongoing issue in Mexico 
and El Salvador. The use of armed forces has increased the number of complaints of 
human rights violations. While there is no clear evidence of these violations in the case of 
El Salvador, family gang members have used the complaints to diminish the punishment 
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of gang members, while at the same time, complaints of human rights violations 
discourage armed forces from working efficiently. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. The complexity of criminality in El Salvador and the impact of using 
armed forces shows that a more comprehensive approach is necessary to effectively 
counter gangs in El Salvador. By uniting efforts from the government, NGOs, and civil 
society, policies aimed to prevent youth from getting involved in gangs could be more 
effective. Strengthening the judiciary and police forces could favor the prosecution of 
criminals, and last, the reconstruction of the Salvadoran social work net can be valuable 
in countering violence in El Salvador. 
2. Regional efforts to control organized crime should be better coordinated. 
The exchange of intelligence, information sharing, and coercive measures could improve 
law enforcement activities in the area. Regional and international organizations such as 
INTERPOL and NGOs are already there but it requires political will and integration to 
coordinate policies that can enable the Central American region to reduce criminality. 
3. As experience has shown that, in the long term, the used of armed forces 
might be counterproductive, it is recommended that armed forces in El Salvador be 
withdrawn from public security missions. Reforms to the judiciary, the police force, and 
the prison system would yield better results, as it is a more comprehensive approach than 
the use of armed forces. 
4. One can conclude that in many cases, the used of armed forces is a 
desperate measure to show the population that political institutions are doing something 
about the problem. This clearly has electoral purposes. Until the problem is addressed 
without the influence of political interest, the problem is likely to continue. Political 
forces in El Salvador should sit together, setting apart party interest and setting up 
achievable goals to at least reduce criminality in the country. 
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APPENDIX.  DRUG CARTELS, FOUNDERS, AND LEADERS 
Cartel Founders Current leaders Area and Type of 
Operations 
Sinaloa, 1970s 
The need for Colombians 
to ship cocaine through 
Mexico greatly increased 
its power and wealth. 
Jaime Herrera Nevares 
“Don Neto”  
Fonseca Carrillo (captured 
1985) 
Pedro Aviles Pérez (killed 
1978) 
Angel Felix Gallardo 
(captured 1989) 
Hector Luis Palma 
(captured 1995) and 
extradited to the U.S. 
Joaquin el Chapo Guzman 
and Ismael “El Mayo” 
Zambada García 
Arturo Beltran Leyva and 
his brother have broken 
with El Chapo to align 
with Los Zetas in Guerrero 
and other areas. 
Juan Jose Esparragoza 
Moreno nicknamed “El 
Azul,” enjoys productive 
linkages with the Sinaloa 
cartel. 
Chapo Guzman captured in 
2014. 
North West Mexico, 
Sinaloa, Durango, 
Chihuahua, Baja California 
(Mexicalli), Sonora 
(Nogales, Agua Prieta, and 
San Luis Rio colorado), 
Nuevo Leon (Monterrey), 
Michoacan Acapulco, and 
Guerrero, move cocaine, 
heroin , and marihuana 
into U.S.. 
Millenio (allied with 
Sinaloa) 
Michoacan, December 
1997, worked with 
Colombian Guillermo 
Moreno Ríos in the meth 
trade. 
Armando “Juanito” 
Valencia Cornelio was the 




succeeded in jailing four 
Valencia Lieutenants 
Luis and Juan Valencia 
operate a crippled 
organization; 
destabilization in 
Michoacan has furtherer 
weakened their power, as 
La Familia and Los Zetas 
have expanded their 
activities in Michoacan 
neighboring states. 
Early in the decade, the 
DEA claimed that it 
supplied one third of 
cocaine to U.S., with 
distribution focused on 
California, Texas, 
Chicago, and New York. 
Its home state is 
Michoacan, along with 
Jalisco, Colima and 
Nayarit, provide entry 
points for cocaine and pre-
cursor drugs 
Sonora (allied with 
Sinaloa) 
Sonora 1970s 
Cultivated enormous and 
sophisticated marihuana 
farms in Sonora and 
Chihuahua, including El 
Bufalo, which was 
discovered by DEA agent 
“Kiki Camanera” 
Badiraguato natives Rafael 
Angel Caro Quintero 
(arrested Apr, 1985) and 
Miguel Caro Quintero 
(arrested Dic2001); the 
cartel aligned with the 
Sinaloa Cartel because of 
the Caro Quintero ties to 
Feliz Gallardo and Ernesto 
Fonseca. 
Miguel Caro Quintero’s 
siblings (Genaro, Jorge, 
María del Carmen, Blanca 
Lili, Melinda and Maria) 
are struggling to hold the 
cartel together; Genaro 
who is missing from sight, 
is the presumed leader 
In his heyday, it exported 
marihuana, cocaine and 
heroin to the U.S., using 
small, low flying aircraft; 
scene of confrontations 
between the Sinaloa and 
Gulf cartels; Governor 
Eduardo Bours cracked 
down on police following 
the May 16, 2007, shoot 
out in an near Cananea, 
which took the lives of 23 
criminals; the assassination 
of State Police 
Commander Juan Manuel 
Pavón Félix in November 
2008 indicates continued 
bloodshed. 
Colima, 1980s 
(allied with Sinaloa Cartel) 
Began as an alien 
smuggling ring. 
Amezcua Contreras 
brothers (José de Jesus, 
Ignacio, Adan, and 
Ventura); all are dead or 
behind bars. 
Imprisonment of brothers 
has left the organization in 
shambles with day-to-day 
management having 
passed to two sisters of the 
Amezcua Contreras clan- 
one of whom, Patricia, is 
married to Tijuana Cartel 
Imported precursor drugs 
from Thailand and India 
via Veracruz and 
Manzanillo to produce 
methamphetamine and 
“ecstasy” which were 
exported to the U.S.; 
supplied meth to AFO and 
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member Jaime Ladino 
Avila. 
trafficked in cocaine in 
association with Cali 
Cartel. 
Oaxaca, 1970s 
Launch grow and sell 
marihuana. 
Pedro Díaz Parada and his 
Family 
Arrest of Diaz Parada in 
2007 emasculated the 
organization; Los Zetas 
seek to gain control of 
areas the cartel once 
dominated. 
In its salad days, the 
syndicate moved 
marijuana and cocaine 
throughout the Isthmus of 
Tehuantepec, a half dozen 
other states, and Texas 
cities; it cooperated with 
Sinaloa Cartel and, later, 
with the Tijuana Cartel. 
The Beltran Leyva 
Brothers 
Sinaloans who for years 
worked with El Chapo and 
El Mayo. 
Arturo “El Barbas,” Héctor 
Alfredo “El H,” Mario 
Alberto “El General,” and 
Carlos Beltran Leyva. 
Sinaloa, Mexico state, 
Jalisco, Durango, D.F:, 
Morelos, certain 
municipalities in the Tierra 
Caliente; Mexico City and 
Monterrey airports; 
cooperate with Los Zetas 
in Guerrero and, possibly 
in the D.F.; Stratfor 
reported that, since the 
arrest of their Colombian 
drug supplier Villafane 
Martinez, the Beltran 
Leyvas have courted 
Victor and Dario Espinosa, 
leader of Colombia’s Norte 
del Valle Cartel. 
Gulf 
Tamaulipas, 1930s 
Juan Nepomucento was a 
bootlegger in the 1930s. 
His nephew persuaded him 
to move into drugs in the 
1960s; the need for 
Colombians to ship 
cocaine through Mexico 
greatly increased its power 
and wealth in the 
mid.1980s. 
Juan Nepomucento Guerra 
(died 2001); Juan García 
Abrego (closet o Raúl 
Salinas) was jailed and 
extradited to U.S. in 1996 
by Zedillo; Salvador “El 
Chava” Gómez (killed 
1999) lost battle with Osiel 
Cárdenas Guillen 
(extradited to U.S. in Jan. 
2007) 
Power struggle among: 
Eduardo “El Coss” Costilla 
Sánchez; Zeta leader 
Heriberto “El Verdugo” 
Lazcano Lazcano; and 




Laredo, Nuevo León, Gulf 
Coast to Quintana Roo, 
Oaxaca, Guerrero, and 
Michoacán; moves 
Colombian cocaine into 
U.S.; practices extreme 
violence via Zetas, which 





Tamaulipas, early in first 
decade of 21st century; ex 
GAFES. 
GAFES recruited by Osiel 
Cárdenas Guillén as 
protectors and enforcers; 
while occasionally 
cooperating with Gulf 
Cartel, Los Zetas now act 
on their own; in addition to 
drug smuggling, they have 
taken up murder-for hire, 
kidnapping, the sale of 
protection, extortion, 
human smuggling, loan-
sharking, and wholesale 
contraband commerce. 
Heriberto “El Verdugo” 
Lazcano Lazcano; and 
Miguel “40” Treviño 
Morales; and, in 
November 2008, 
authorities arrested Jaime 
“El Hummer” González 
Durán, the third ranking 
member of the 
paramilitaries. 
Cellular organizations in 
Tamaulipas, Veracruz, 
Villahermosa (Tabasco), 
Quintana Roo, Guerrero, 
Oaxaca, Michoacán, 
Aguascalientes, Durango, 
san Luis Potosí, Jalisco, 
Hidalgo, Mexico State, and 
D.F., the U.S. (Atlanta, 
Dallas and Los Angeles), 
and Guatemala. 
Tijuana/Arellano Félix 
Organization or AFO 
(allied with Gulf Cartel) 
Baja California 1980s 
Launched after 1989 arrest 
After the arrest of Felix 
Gallardo, (1) Javier Caro 
Payán, who (2) was 
displaced by Jesus el Chuy 
Labra, (3) whose capture 
Weak leadership at the top 
has found the loyalist of 
Benjamin, the only family 
member who could enforce 
discipline, staking out their 
Tijuana BC., parts of 
Sinaloa, Sonora, Jalisco, 
and Tamulipas; difficulty 
obtaining Colombian 
cocaine, although it has 
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of Felix Gallardo, who 
distributed plazas to 
maintain order; the need 
for Colombians to ship 
cocaine greatly increased 
its power and wealth in the 
1980s. 
placed control in the hands 
of Arellano Felix brothers; 
authorities apprehended 
the group’s CEO Ismael 
“El Mayel” Higuera 
Guerrero (2000); killed 
Ramón A/F (2002), 
arrested Benjamin A/F 
(2002)Javier A/F (2006) 
and Eduardo A/F (200(¿8) 
own plazas: Jorge “El 
Cholo” Briseño Lopez 
(rosarito); and Eduardo 
“EL Teo” Garcia Simental. 
In March 2008 authorities 
arrested Eduardo Gustavo 
Rivera Martinez, who had 
held sway in Ensenada; 
Enedinas’s nephew, Luis 
Fernando “The Aligner” 
Sanchez Arellano and her 
son, Fernando “The 
Engineer” Zamora 
Arellano together are 
competing for control of 
Tijuana against El Teo. 
increased marijuana 
production and handles 
meth, severely weakened 
by deaths and arrests of 
several brothers; recruits 
youngsters from well-to-do 
area families and uses 
these pampered hoodlums 
to practice tortures and 
dismember foes; once 
nurtured ties with 
Colombian FARC. 
La Familia 
Michoacán, early part of 
first decade of twenty first 
century 
Sprang to life as La 
Empresa, which worked 
with the Golf Cartel to 
expel Los Valencias from 
Michoacán; evolved into 
LA Familia, which sought 
both to curb Los Zetas’s 
activities in the state and to 
fight the sale of 
methamphetamines to 
youngsters; now involved 
in murder-for hire, 
extortion, human 
smuggling, kidnapping, 
and the wholesale 
distribution of contraband; 
some elements of La 
Familia exhibit a strong 
messianic religious 
orientation; extraordinary 
violent, including the 
beheading of foes; hurt in 
the May 26, 2009 arrest of 
29 public officers. 
Jose de Jesús “ El Chango” 
Méndez, Nazario “El 
Chayo”/”El Mas Loco” 
Moreno Gonzalez Antonio 
“El Toñon” Arcos, 
Servando “El Profe” 
Gomez Martinez, and 
Dionisio “The Uncle” 
Loya Plancarte; on July 11 
2009, Federal Police 
captured Arnold “La 
Minsa” Rueda Medina, the 
syndicate’s number three 
operative; major sectors of 
the organization show 
intense messianic zeal. 
Aguascalientes,Colima, 
D.F. Guanajuato, Jalisco, 
Mexico State, Michoacan 
San Luis Potosi, part of 
Guatemala and the U.S.: 
Source: George W. Grayson, Mexico Narco-Violence and a failed State? Transaction Publishers, 
NewBrunswick,2011.  
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